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INTRODUCTION 
Whoever commands the sea commands the trade; 
whosoever commands the trade of the world 
commands the riches of the world, and consequently 
the world itself.1 
Often an afterthought, the multi-trillion annual maritime 
transportation industry plays an essential role in driving fashion’s 
global economic development.2 Thoughts of ocean transportation 
in the fashion context should not just invoke images of iconic 
Louis Vuitton steamer trunks.3 All stages of production—from 
transportation of raw materials to delivery of final products—
require ocean freight transportation.4 
The future of fashion is fraught with instability as seismic 
shifts in the global economy present a series of significant 
challenges. As consumer habits change, the industry’s stakeholders 
are searching for innovation and growth potential. Statistical 
analysis makes clear that the industry must engage in omni-
channel retail emphasizing e-commerce. Estimates suggest that 
luxury e-commerce sales will increase fourfold from 2010 to 
2020.5 Regardless of how goods are sold—whether at a flagship 
store on Fifth Avenue, a mall in middle America, or with the click 
of a keyboard—“over 90% of the world’s trade is carried by sea.”6 
 
1 As observed by Sir Walter Raleigh in 1616. See Sam J. Tangredi, The Future of 
Maritime Power, in THE POLITICS OF MARITIME POWER: A SURVEY 132 (Andrew T.H. 
Tan, ed., Routledge, 2007). 
2 See Nanette Byrnes, This $1 Trillion Industry Is Finally Going Digital, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602596/this-1-trillion-
industry-is-finally-going-digital/ [https://perma.cc/7CSY-ZENR]. 
3 See Legendary History, LOUIS VUITTON, http://us.louisvuitton.com/eng-us/la-
maison/a-legendary-history#how-it-all-began [https://perma.cc/LF8E-G9VA] (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2019); see also Retracing The Trunk, LOUIS VUITTON, http://us.louisvuitton.com
/eng-us/articles/retracing-the-trunk [https://perma.cc/2KP4-QCRA] (last visited Feb. 9, 
2019). 
4 See Byrnes, supra note 3. 
5 See The State of Fashion, BUS. OF FASHION (2017), 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news-analysis/the-state-of-fashion-2017 
[https://perma.cc/V5QM-ZLLT]. 
6 International Maritime Organization, UNITED NATIONS, https://
business.un.org/en/entities/13 [https://perma.cc/CQA6-HPWZ] (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019). 
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In 2015, global seaborne trade surpassed ten billion tons.7 Rather 
than only focusing on e-commerce development, fashion brands 
and retailers must analyze their relationships with the international 
transportation logistics industry.8 
In addition to evaluating shipping risks, from insurance to 
recovery for lost, delayed, and damaged goods, the fashion 
industry must be wary of monopolistic pushes in the logistics 
sector which could impose a blockade between the industry and its 
consumers. Aware of the challenges it faces from a luxury retailer 
standpoint, Amazon looks to its expanding logistics empire to 
enter, disrupt, and ultimately control the luxury fashion market. 
While luxury and contemporary brands can rely on non-Amazon e-
commerce platforms, they cannot obviate their needs for third-
party shipping intermediaries unless they also develop logistics 
divisions. Due to expense, expertise, and distraction from core 
business, it is unlikely that luxury and contemporary fashion 
players will move directly into the logistics sector. Cognizant of 
these brands, and retailers’ inabilities to deliver products from their 
places of production to warehouses, storefronts, and customers, 
Amazon seeks to dominate the international intermodal delivery 
business.9 If successful, Amazon will control the flow of goods in 
transportation, thereby placing every brand and retailer at risk of 
losing access to the worldwide marketplace. 
I. THE VOYAGE OF A DRESS 
A. The Fashion Industry’s Dependence on Ocean Transportation 
Before arriving in a customer’s closet, a dress likely traverses 
the globe via blue water seafaring vessels. Domestically, vessels 
 
7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime 
Transport 2016 at x, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/RMT/2016 (Nov. 2016), http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T3Z-PAFS] (“In 
addition in 2015, estimated world seaborne trade volumes surpassed 10 billion tons – the 
first time in the records of UNCTAD.”) [hereinafter United Nations]. 
8 See The State of Fashion, supra note 6, at 52. 
9 See Laura Stevens, Amazon Expands into Ocean Freight, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 
2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-expands-into-ocean-freight-1485357884 
[http://perma.cc/8KWL-WDL9]. 
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carried $1.6 trillion in aggregate imports to and exports from the 
United States in 2015.10 The U.S. Department of Transportation 
specifically indicates that “retailers are increasingly dependent on 
the U.S. transportation system, especially those that build up their 
inventories in October in anticipation of holiday sales in November 
and December.”11 Other options are available, however, methods 
such as air transportation are usually prohibitively expensive. 
Maritime shipping leads in both weight and value of total imports 
and exports. “Ships moved more than 71.1% of trade weight and 
41.8 percent of trade value in 2015.”12 New York City and Los 
Angeles, anchoring the domestic fashion industry on both coasts, 
are close to the Atlantic and Pacific’s leading container ports.13 
At some point in production, most garments, shoes, and 
accessories rely on the trillion dollar ocean shipping market within 
the global supply chain.14 As a matter of illustration, take the 
lifecycle of a cotton tee-shirt.15 First, cotton is planted and 
harvested in locations such as China, India, and Pakistan.16 Next, 
the raw material is woven into cloth, likely in China, India, 
Pakistan, Turkey, or Brazil.17 Thereafter, the cloth is shipped for 
production elsewhere, probably China.18 Once assembled, the 
 
10 See UNITED STATES DEP’T TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT 
71 (2016). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 74. 
13 See id. at 77. 
14 See Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
419, 425 (2015). 
15 See The Life of a Garment, from Seed to Sale: 6 Steps in the Fashion Supply Chain, 
APPAREL BUS. SYS. (Apr. 9, 2015), http://apparelbusiness.com/the-life-of-a-garment-
from-seed-to-sale-6-steps-in-the-fashion-supply-chain/ [http://perma.cc/33Z6-6CWJ]; see 
also The Lifecycle of a Cotton T-shirt, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/specials/living/tshirt-
lifecycle/2012/index.html [http://perma.cc/B3A2-JNAF] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
16 See CNN, supra note 16. 
17 See id. 
18 See Robb Young, Can China Still Complete as the World’s Fashion Factory?, BUS. 
OF FASHION (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.businessoffashion.com/community/voices
/discussions/can-china-still-compete-as-the-worlds-fashion-factory/new-era-for-chinese-
fashion-production-manufacturers [http://perma.cc/XU3V-5DCT]. While China currently 
produces “60 percent of the world’s shoes and export[s] over 43 percent of the world’s 
clothing,” as the cost of labor increases in China, brands have begun to move production 
to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Id. 
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cotton tee-shirt makes its way stateside via a vessel for temporary 
storage in warehouses located at various domestic ports.19 Lastly, 
the garment moves from the warehouse near the port to either a 
storefront or directly to the consumer. Luxury items, even haute 
couture gowns and bespoke suits, share an analogous dependency 
on maritime transportation, as it is “by far the most cost-effective 
way to move en masse goods and raw materials around the 
world,”20 to deliver Italian silk to tailors not only in Milan, but also 
in Seoul, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing, London, and beyond.  
B. Admiralty Law: An Ancient but Still Significant System of Law 
Admiralty and maritime laws are often labeled arcane, which is 
to be expected since “[s]hipping activity existed even in prehistoric 
times in the Persian Gulf and in the Arabian Sea.”21 Even “[t]he 
Code of Hammurapi (Hammurabi), which was written in Old 
Babylonian in cuneiform letters in about 1800 B.C., contains 
provisions dealing with marine collisions and ship leasing.”22 
Subsequent seafaring cultures prospered. The ancient Egyptians 
used ports in the eastern Mediterranean Sea to import goods and 
the Phoenicians developed and maintained power through oceanic 
trade.23 By 800 B.C., Greek maritime law developed “based upon 
constantly recurring customs and transactions between buyers, 
sellers, shipowners, crews, and bankers,”24 proving that Classical 
influence is not limited to Gucci runway shows.25 
 
19 See, e.g., Warehouses, S. CAROLINA PORTS, http://www.scspa.com/cargo
/logistics/warehouses/ [https://perma.cc/ALA8-JTDU] (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
20 United Nations, supra note 7. 
21 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 3 (3d ed. 2001). 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Sarah Mover, Fall 2016 Ready-To-Wear Gucci, VOGUE (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/fall-2016-ready-to-wear/gucci 
[https://perma.cc/6LET-GSLA] (Gucci’s creative director, Alessandro Michele, posted 
“snaps of Italian art, antiques, and antiquities since long before a wave of success carried 
him to the forefront of fashion influence.”); see also Philip Chrysopoulos, Athens Says 
‘No’ to Gucci for Fashion Show on Acropolis Hill, GREEKREPORTER (Feb. 15, 2017), 
http://greece.greekreporter.com/2017/02/15/athens-says-no-to-gucci-for-fashion-show-
on-acropolis-hill/ [https://perma.cc/AK8G-VEB9]. 
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Vessels have modernized, as “[t]ankers, bulk carriers and 
container ships are the most important means of transportation of 
our time.”26 Nevertheless, contemporary domestic and 
international maritime laws center on the same relationships that 
defined the laws of ancient Greece regarding the movement of 
cargo. “Cargo can be anything: manufactured articles or 
components or raw materials, liquids or solids or gases, live 
animals or frozen meat, smaller ships, and especially nowadays, 
containers of goods.”27 The party providing cargo is called the 
“shipper.”28 To actually transport cargo, whether it is five dollar 
flip flops or thousand Euro Italian leather loafers, the shipper must 
contract for space on a vessel. Although some shipowners work 
directly with shippers, most likely a “carrier” that “operates the 
ship and takes possession of the cargo” will serve as a third-party 
intermediary between the shipper and the shipowner.29 
Intermodal or multimodal transportation of goods references 
door-to-door transportation using all modes of transportation from 
air to sea to land.30 With the technological advance of 
containerization, cargo packed in containers can “move easily from 
one mode of transport to another, from a road vehicle to a ship, 
onto railway wagons (called piggy-back traffic), or aboard an 
airplane” without being disturbed during the journey.31 Intermodal 
transportation, while efficient, poses unique challenges to the legal 
system especially regarding antitrust.32 
 
26 Global Shipping – A Dynamic Market, WORLD OCEAN REV., 
http://worldoceanreview.com/en/wor-1/transport/global-shipping/ 
[https://perma.cc/B96P-5Z54] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
27 NICHOLAS J. HEALY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 344 (5th ed. 
2012). 
28 See id. 
29 Id. 
30 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at 28–29. 
31 Id. at 29. 
32 See id. at 30–31. Intermodal transportation creates tension between different 
regulatory bodies. The Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”), discussed in detail 
below, governs maritime transportation. The Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) has 
jurisdiction over air carriers and the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) regulates 
rail and motor carriage. Moreover, the antitrust laws and exemptions governing different 
elements of the intermodal transportation vary. While the ICC has specific exemptions, 
the scope of this paper covers those provided to marine transportation under the Shipping 
Act of 1984 and governed by the FMC. 
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C. Fashionable Freight Concerns 
Before a fashion brand or retailer even considers shipping its 
goods, it most likely entered into a contract of sale between itself 
and a buyer. “A contract for the carriage of goods is never 
concluded in isolation. It is always part of an intimately linked 
system of contracts.”33 The initial contract—whether between a 
brand and a buyer or an e-commerce retailer and a customer—is 
governed by commercial law principles, not maritime law.34 The 
next step—actual transportation of goods—requires a series of 
maritime contracts centered on a “bill of lading” or contract of 
carriage: 
In carriage by water, the contract of carriage is often 
embodied in a negotiable bill of lading and, 
although today there are other forms of shipping 
documents used in particular trades, many 
shipments are still made pursuant to negotiable bills 
of lading. A “bill of lading” is a multifunctional 
document: It embodies a contract of carriage and 
also serves as a receipt by the carrier that it has 
received the goods. The bill of lading is a document 
of delivery as well as a document of title.35 
 
The concept of a bill of lading is not exclusive to ocean 
transportation. In simple terms, a bill of lading is the legal 
document which shippers rely upon to entrust their goods to a 
carrier to transport them from point A to point B.36 
Most goods shipped in international common carriage—such 
as fashion products—are shipped under negotiable bills of lading.37 
As commercial instruments, bills of lading have serious 
 
33 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at 2. 
34 See id. 
35 Robert Force, Admiralty and Maritime Law, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 54 (2013), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Admiralty2d.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8YB-
AHAZ]; see also HEALY ET AL., supra note 27, at 344. “‘Bill’ is a contraction of the 
French billet, a note; ‘lading’ is derived from the Old English ‘hladen,’ from which the 
word ‘load’ is traced.” Id. 
36 See Force, supra note 36, at 54. 
37 See U.C.C. § 7-104. 
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implications for the financing of the fashion industry. The seller 
obtains the negotiable, clean on-board bill of lading when its goods 
are placed on-board the carrying vessel. In turn, the seller presents 
the bill of lading to its bank. That bank then makes payment to the 
seller from the letter of credit established, commonly at a different 
bank, by the buyer of the seller’s goods. The commercial world 
relies on negotiable bills of lading.38 For over a century, U.S. 
courts have repeatedly adhered to an explicit rule governing the 
sanctity of negotiable bills of lading: 
In the developments of commerce and commercial 
credits the bill of lading has come to represent the 
property, but with greater facility of negotiation, 
transfer, and delivery than the property itself . . . 
And it has become so universal and necessary a 
factor in mercantile credits that the law should make 
good what the bill of lading thus holds out. There is 
every reason found in the law of equitable estoppel 
and in sound public policy for holding, and no 
injustice is involved in holding, that, if one of two 
must suffer, it should be he who voluntarily puts out 
of his hands an assignable bill of lading, rather than 
he who innocently advances value thereon.39 
 
Stated simply, the issuer of the bill of lading controls important 
financial aspects of most domestic and international transactions 
where the goods are financed and transported using these 
documents. 
A shipper may contract with a variety of different legal entities 
in order to have its goods transported across the sea. As 
aforementioned and although uncommon, a shipowner may itself 
enter into a contract of carriage and issue a bill of lading.40 More 
likely, shippers will work with intermediaries. The two most 
 
38 See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at 8. “Bills of lading is a creation of 
mercantile custom dating back at least to medieval times.” Id. at 59. 
39 Berisford Metals Corp. v. S/S Salvador, 779 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing 
Pollard v. Reardon, 65 F. 848, 852 (1st Cir. 1895)). 
40 See Force, supra note 36, at 54–55. 
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common ocean shipping intermediaries are: 1) freight forwarders 
and 2) non-vessel operating common carriers (“NVOCC”).41 As 
transportation experts and agents of shippers, freight forwarders 
assist in arranging for the transportation of goods.42 For example, 
FedEx43 and UPS44 offer international freight forwarding services. 
Like charters and freight forwarders, NVOCCs are not shipowners. 
Rather, they are “persons who undertake to transport goods of 
shippers as though they had their own vessels but who, in reality, 
contract with owners or charterers of vessels to actually perform 
the transportation function.”45 For example, Danmar Lines 
operates as DHL’s NVOCC.46 
The difference between freight forwarders and NVOCCs 
relates to bills of lading, which are issued either by the shipowner 
or someone else who receives the shipper’s cargo for the 
shipowner.47 Whereas a freight forwarder does not issue a bill of 
lading, a NVOCC does, often by contracting with a freight 
forwarder. While seemingly semantic, this difference has serious 
impacts on the third-parties’ liability imposed under contract law 
and the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (“COGSA”).48 
 
41 See id. at 65. 
42 See id. 
43 FedEx Trade Networks International Freight Forwarding, FEDEX, 
http://ftn.fedex.com/us/services/transportation/freightforwarding.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/HAX4-MKZD] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
44 UPS Transportation & Freight, UPS, https://www.ups-scs.com/support/freight-
forwarding.html [https://perma.cc/K6K7-ZK2G] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
45 See Force, supra note 36, at 43. 
46 DHL Ocean Freight, DHL, https://www.logistics.dhl/iq-en/home/our-
divisions/global-forwarding/ocean-freight.html [https://perma.cc/UG3R-B2QC] (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2019); see also Customers Reduce Their Carbon Footprint with DHL’s 
New Green Service Press Release, DHL (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://www.dhl.com/en/press/releases/releases_2016/all/logistics/customers_reduce_their
_carbon_footprint_with_dhls_new_green_service.html [https://perma.cc/J63W-NJNJ]. 
47 See HEALY ET AL., supra note 28, at 346. 
48 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note, introductory cmt., §§ 1–16 (2006). In 2006, Congress re-
codified Title 46 that deals with Shipping. In doing so, it omitted the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act (“COGSA”). The solution was to include COGSA as a note to § 30701 which 
is the first section of the Harter Act. Thus, a reference to former 46 U.S.C. § 1301 will be 
cited hereinafter to the individual sections of COGSA within the note, e.g., COGSA § 1. 
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The United States incorporated a modified version of the 
international law of the Hague Rules49 by enacting COGSA in 
1936.50 “The provisions of COGSA apply as a matter of statutory 
mandate to ‘[e]very bill of lading or similar document of title 
which is evidence of a contract of carriage of goods by sea to or 
from ports of the United States, in foreign trade.’”51 COGSA thus 
applies to shipowners and NVOCCs but not freight forwarders. 
Moreover, COGSA does not govern domestic voyages, for 
example movement from the Port of Savannah to the Port of 
Norfolk. Rather, it exclusively pertains to foreign trade.52 COGSA, 
however, may be extended by contract to govern domestic trade, 
private carriage, and the period before loading and after 
discharge.53 
Carriers covered by COGSA must exercise due diligence both 
before and at the commencement of the voyage to: 
 provide a seaworthy ship; 
 properly equip, man, and supply the ship; and 
 make the holds, refrigeration and cooling 
chambers, and all other areas of the vessel 
where goods are carried, fit and safe for their 
reception, preservation, and carriage.54 
Moreover, COGSA requires covered carriers to “properly and 
carefully load, handle, stow, care for, and discharge the goods 
 
49 See generally International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
relating to Bills of Lading (the Hague Rules), opened for signature Aug. 25, 1924, 51 
Stat. 233; T.S. No. 931; 120 U.N.T.S. 155 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1937). The Hague 
Rules were a multilateral treaty. 
50 See generally Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading (Visby Amendments), Brussels, 
February 1968; (U.N.) Register of Texts, ch. 2 (the Visby Amendments to the Hague 
Rules are also referred to as the Hague-Visby Rules). 
51 See Force, supra note 36, at 62 (citing COGSA introductory comment.). If, however, 
a freight forwarder actually undertakes to transport the goods, despite the fact that the 
goods are carried on a vessel owners or operated by a third party (either NVOCC or 
shipowner), its legal status and exposure to liability may change. See, e.g., J.C. Penney v. 
Am. Exp. Co., 102 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff’d, 201 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1953). 
52 See Force, supra note 36, at 61. 
53 See, e.g., In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972). 
54 COGSA § 3(1). 
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carried.”55 Generally under COGSA, a shipper may recover if its 
cargo is damaged or lost at sea. The statute of limitations under 
COGSA, however, is a mere twelve months from the date of 
delivery of goods.56 
While COGSA places stringent responsibilities on carriers, it 
also provides protection. Foremost, carriers are not insurers of 
cargo under COGSA.57 Moreover, COGSA does not impose strict 
liability as it only requires a carrier to exercise due diligence. It 
further provides carriers with five categories of immunities:58 
 First, some immunities excuse a carrier 
notwithstanding the loss or damage to cargo 
resulting from the negligence of its employees. 
The defense based on errors in navigation of the 
vessel the defense based on errors in the 
management of the vessel, and the fire defense 
fall into this category. 
 Second, there are defenses based on 
overwhelming outside forces, such as acts of 
war, acts of public enemies, arrest or restraint of 
princes (governments), quarantines, strikes or 
lockouts, and riots or civil commotions. 
 The third category includes loss or damage 
caused by overwhelming natural forces, 
including perils of the sea and acts of God. 
 The fourth group deals with loss or damage 
attributable to faults of the shipper, which 
include acts or omissions of the shipper or its 
agents, wastage in bulk or weight, losses 
resulting from inherent vice, and insufficiency 
of packaging or marking. 
 Finally, the fifth category includes loss or 
damage that occurs despite a carrier’s exercise 
of due care. This includes loss or damage 
 
55 Id. § 3(2). 
56 Id. § 3(6). 
57 See Force, supra note 36, at 67. 
58 See id. 
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resulting from an unseaworthy condition not 
discoverable through the exercise of due care, 
from latent defects, and from situations where a 
carrier can establish that it and its servants and 
agents exercised due care and that loss or 
damage was occasioned through the conduct of 
others or circumstances for which it is not 
responsible.59 
While a shipper cannot contract out the above immunities 
provided to a carrier under COGSA, it can and should protect itself 
against potential losses by clearly drafting the language of the bill 
of lading. 
D. The Well-Packaged Suit 
Shippers must beware of COGSA’s “$500 per package 
limitation” in the event of a loss. Even when a claim for loss or 
damage of cargo is recoverable, the cargo owner may find its 
recovery limited by law. The COGSA package limitation provides 
that: 
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any 
event be or become liable for any loss or damage to 
or in connection with the transportation of goods in 
an amount exceeding $500 per package . . . unless 
the nature and value of such goods have been 
declared by the shipper before shipment and 
inserted in the bill of lading. This declaration, if 
embodied in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie 
evidence, but shall not be conclusive on the carrier. 
By agreement between the carrier, master, or 
agent of the carrier, and the shipper another 
maximum amount than that mentioned in this 
paragraph may be fixed: Provided, That such 
maximum shall not be less than the figure above 
named. In no event shall the carrier be liable for 
more than the amount of damage actually sustained. 
 
59 Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30706 (2012). 
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Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be 
responsible in any event for loss or damage to or in 
connection with the transportation of the goods if 
the nature or value thereof has been knowingly and 
fraudulently misstated by the shipper in the bill of 
lading. (emphasis added)60 
COGSA allows for freedom in agreement, “but only in the 
direction of increasing the shipowner’s liabilities, and never in the 
direction of diminishing them.”61 Shippers should thus take 
advantage of contract negotiations. In the event of a dispute, it is 
better to rely upon meticulously crafted bill of lading language 
rather than leave uncertainties to be decided by the trier of fact in 
court. 
In evaluating whether COGSA’s $500 package limitation 
applies, courts first evaluate whether the goods in question were 
shipped in packages. The $500 limitation applies equally to 
packages and customary freight units (“CFU”).62 Almost all cargo 
will be deemed to be in a package if, “irrespective of its size, 
weight, or shape, is fitted into or on some packaging preparation 
that facilitates handling or stowage.”63 Case law has developed 
such that only unwrapped and fully exposed items are not 
considered packages.64 
The second prong of the analysis—what is defined as a 
package specifically under COGSA—is a much more complex 
issue. A major problem with the $500 package limitation arose as 
shipping technology advanced. Unlike the vessels used when 
COGSA was enacted, today’s dry cargo vessels routinely depend 
upon containers to transport goods carefully and safely.65 
 
60 COGSA § 4(5). 
61 Marcraft Clothes, Inc. v. M/V Kurobe Maru, 575 F. Supp. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(citing Gilmore & Black, § 3–25 at 145 (emphasis in original)). 
62 See COGSA § 4(5). Because fashion goods would not constitute CFUs, no further 
discussion will be included in this paper. 
63 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at 156. 
64 See id. 
65 The term “dry cargo” covers fashion goods, whereas “liquid cargo” refers to 
predominantly oil but may also include chemicals and liquefied gasses. See generally 
Vessel Types Explained, SHIPPING GUIDES, LTD., 
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Containerization, the use of large metal boxes either twenty 
(“TEU”) or forty feet (“FEU”) long, allows for consolidation and 
protection of cargo.66 When COGSA became law in 1936, 
however, “‘[f]ew, if any . . . could have foreseen the change in the 
optimum size of shipping units.”67 Consequently, “neither the 
statute nor its legislative history provides any clue as to the 
meaning of ‘package’ in the Act.”68 Instead, courts look to the 
intent of the contracting parties to evaluate the meaning of package 
in the age of containerization. If not specified otherwise, a 
container holding millions of dollars’ worth of cargo arguably may 
be subject to the $500 package limitation under COGSA. 
Marcraft Clothes, Inc. v. M/V Kurobe Maru69 illustrates why 
fashion companies must be particularly careful in avoiding 
litigation over the meaning of a “package” in light of COGSA’s 
$500 package limitation. In this case, Marcraft, a commercial 
buyer of men’s suits, sued the carrier for damages sustained to 
4400 suits in transport to New York. Arguing that “the one 
shipping container furnished by the carrier is a single ‘package,’” 
the carrier filed a motion for summary judgment seeking limitation 
of liability to $500 total for the 4400 damaged suits as a matter of 
law under COGSA.70 In opposition, Marcraft argued that each 
individual suit should be considered a separate package and thus it 
was entitled up to $2.2 million in damages.71 
In Marcraft, the bill of lading described the container of goods 
as “4,400 Sets of Men’s Suits with Vest.” This language alone did 
not solve the issue as to whether each suit was considered an 
 
https://www.portinfo.co.uk/portinformation/ourmaritimeblog/vessel-types-explained 
[http://perma.cc/B6DP-YXKA] (last visited Jan. 23, 2019). 
66 See Force, supra note 36, at 43. Generally, TEU means twenty foot equivalent and 
FEU means forty-foot equivalent. These terms define the amount of available container 
carriage space aboard a vessel. 
67 Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing 
Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 
375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1967)). 
68 See Monica Textile Corp., 952 F.2d at 638. 
69 575 F. Supp. 239, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
70 See id. at 241. 
71 See id. 
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individual package.72 Instead, the Court looked to how the suits 
were packaged: 
Each suit in its raw condition may not be a section 
4(5) “package,” but here the shipper had placed the 
suits on a hanger and wrapped each in a plastic bag 
in such a way as to conform to the accepted 
definitions of package, such as “a small or moderate 
size pack, . . . a commodity in its container [the 
plastic bag], . . . [or] a protective unit for storing or 
shipping a commodity.”73 
The fact that the suits were placed on hangers and individually 
wrapped, in tandem with the bill of lading’s cargo description, 
allowed the Court to hold that the carrier’s liability limitation was 
$2.2 million, not $500.74 
The application of the law, however, remains murky. 
Generally, a container will not be subject to the $500 package 
limitation, but the inquiry is fact-specific and in exceptional cases, 
the recovery container may be limited to $500. In Monica Textile 
Corp. v. S.S. Tana, while holding that each of the seventy-six bales 
of cloth stowed inside a shipping container were considered 
individual packages under COGSA and thus the textile shipper was 
entitled to recover up to $380,000 as opposed to merely $500, the 
Court made clear that “all ‘packages’ were not created equal.”75 
Therefore, when shipping millions of dollars of clothes, shoes, or 
accessories across the ocean, fashion companies cannot leave the 
ramifications of COGSA’s $500 package limitation up to chance. 
E. The Necessity of Marine Insurance 
Marine insurance is an essential and relatively inexpensive cost 
of doing business. Foremost, it prevents the risk of recovering only 
 
72 Id. at 242. 
73 Id. at 243 (citing Smythgreyhound v. M/V Eurygenes, 666 F.2d 746, 814 (2d Cir. 
1981)). 
74 See id. at 243. In denying the carrier’s motion for summary judgment, the Southern 
District of New York held that the liability limitation under COGSA was $2.2 million 
(4400 x 500 per package), however, Marcraft still had to prove its damages at trial. Id. 
Ultimately, the case settled. Id.  
75 Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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a small fraction of the actual value of the goods, which could be 
the result under COGSA. It also shifts that risk—along with all 
other risks of cargo recovery litigation—to the subrogated cargo 
insurer.76 The ocean marine cargo policy often extends coverage 
for the period while the goods are “in transit” from the place of 
origin through delivery, and while goods are in storage. “Marine 
insurance contracts are subject to the rules that generally govern 
contracts, except to the extent that legislation provides a specific 
rule to apply to insurance contracts.”77 While a variety of marine 
insurance exists, fashion companies as shippers will be most 
concerned with cargo insurance. Often written as an “all risks” 
policy, cargo insurance can cover the intermodal shipment of 
goods from the shipper’s warehouse to the consignee’s 
warehouse.78 Alternatively, the parties to the cargo insurance 
policy can contract different, more individualized coverage terms 
depending on their needs. 
Furthermore, cargo insurance is essential in cases of general 
average. The maritime law principle of the general average “is a 
means of equitable sharing, between shipowner and cargo interests, 
of certain losses and expenses that occur during a voyage.”79 The 
doctrine, “rooted in the notion that a voyage is a common 
adventure between the vessel owner and the cargo owners,” 
provides that all parties to the venture, including all shippers, 
proportionately share any losses.80 For example, if during a storm a 
shipowner sacrifices some cargo to protect the vessel, the surviving 
cargo is required to contribute along with the ship and its bunkers 
to the general average.81 Thus, even if a shipper’s goods are not 
 
76 See Force, supra note 36, at 199; see also LESLIE J. BUGLASS, MARINE INSURANCE 
AND GENERAL AVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN AVERAGE ADJUSTER’S VIEWPOINT 
441 (3d ed. 1991) (“Subrogation is ‘the right by which an underwriter, having settled a 
loss, is entitled to place himself in the position of the assured, to the extent of acquiring 
all the rights and remedies in respect of the loss which the assured may have 
possessed.’”). 
77 See Force, supra note 36, at 193. 
78 See id. at 198 (citing Brammer Corp. v. Holland-Am. Ins. Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 512 
(1962)). 
79 See id. at 207. 
80 Id. 
81 “Bunkers” refers to fuel in the maritime context. Initially, “bunkers” referred to the 
space in early steamships where coal, which was the fuel at the time, was stowed. 
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impacted and arrive soundly at the port, the shipper may be 
financially liable for the damaged goods. The marine cargo 
insurers post a general average bond which permits the release of 
the cargo. Therefore, cargo insurance plays a critical role in 
limiting this unique maritime exposure to the shipper. 
Moreover, usually the insurers assist in making arrangements 
for on-shipment to final destination. Marine insurance also 
responds to transshipment and second freight costs in the unusual 
cases where cargo is not delivered at the intended destination. 
F. Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Concerns 
Additionally, shippers must carefully consider choice of law 
concerns when entering into maritime transportation contracts. 
Practically all ocean freight transportation involves international 
issues: 
The shipping industry operates worldwide. Vessels 
on a single voyage may call at one or more foreign 
ports. Vessels often are supplied and repaired in 
foreign ports. Cargo may be damaged or lost while 
at sea in the course of an international voyage or in 
a foreign port, and likewise seamen may be injured 
on the high seas or in the waters of foreign 
countries. Today, international shipping is a 
complex business, and its activities are conducted in 
a manner that often implicates the interests of 
several countries.82 
Most choices of law in cargo cases result from contractual 
terms contained in the bills of lading or charter parties. The 
contracting parties agree, before the goods are shipped, to apply 
specific law to any litigation that may arise. Of course, COGSA 
mandates that, at a minimum, U.S. law governs the shipment of all 
cargo, in common carriage, to or from the United States. Even in 
the post-Sky Reefer era, where the contract of carriage may provide 
for foreign litigation or arbitration forums, COGSA remains the 
irreducible minimum standard governing liability and damages 
 
82 See Force, supra note 36, at 23. 
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issues in cases of international common carriage.83 The parties are 
free to agree to liability terms and limitation amounts that exceed 
the COGSA minimums. In the unusual case where COGSA or the 
Harter Act84 would not apply as a matter of law or as a contractual 
term, and in the absence of contractual choice of law provisions, a 
U.S. admiralty court would have to turn to well-established 
admiralty choice of law rules. The Supreme Court created the 
Laurizen-Rhoditis test that considers a variety of factors when 
evaluating maritime choice of law disputes: 
1. the place of the wrongful act, 
2. the law of the flag, 
3. the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman, 
4. the allegiance of the defendant shipowner, 
5. the place where the contract of employment was 
made, 
6. the inaccessibility of a foreign forum, 
7. the law of the forum, and 
8. the shipowner’s base of operations.85 
Rather than leave such an amorphous evaluation to the trier of 
fact when a litigated dispute arises, fashion companies should 
explicitly exclude foreign substantive law in their contracts. 
In addition to choice of law, jurisdictional and forum non 
conveniens issues arise out of ocean transportation’s innately 
international aspect.86 These disputes also can be avoided through 
clear contract language. U.S. fashion brands must protect their 
interests and avoid foreign litigation. For example, China plays a 
major role in much ocean freight transportation.87 The Chinese 
 
83 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995) (The 
Supreme Court held bills of lading that include foreign arbitration clauses do not lessen a 
carrier’s liability under COGSA and can be enforced). 
84 See generally The Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30701 (2012). 
85 See Force, supra note 36, at 24–25. 
86 See id. at 23. 
87 See Steve Saxon & Matt Stone, Container Shipping; The Next 50 Years, MCKINSEY 
& CO. (Oct. 2017), https://www.safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/McKinsey-
Container-shipping-The-next-50-years-2017_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YB6-DBHM] 
(“China’s integration into the global economy, during the 1990s and 2000s, contributed 
very significantly to the growth of trade as manufacturing value chains adapted to utilize 
the country’s abundant labor and to serve new customers. China became the world’s 
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legal system, however, should be avoided because there are some 
uncontrollable forces within it that cannot be avoided including 
uneven enforcement, procedural barriers, and local 
protectionism.88 Thus, to the extent possible, shippers should avoid 
foreign courts and provide for exclusive U.S. jurisdiction in its 
contracts and seek to achieve realistic damage limitations, not the 
$500.00 package limit. Additionally, the service of process should 
be designated upon an agent in the U.S. While these safeguards 
still leave risk of actions by or against third-parties that may be 
forced into foreign courts, they are a proactive way to avoid the 
risks inherent within foreign legal systems. COGSA, as a matter of 
law, controls all common carriage shipments to and from the U.S. 
in international trade. Additionally, COGSA frequently is the 
contractual term governing liability in private international 
shipments, domestic trade, and custody of cargo before loading 
and after discharge. 
Two major factual issues impacting choice of law and 
jurisdiction are the loading and delivery ports. Unless the parties 
expressly agree to arbitration, exclusive jurisdiction, and choice of 
law in the contracts of sale and carriage, the courts will have to 
determine those issues based upon the facts and law. The loading 
and discharge ports usually are determined by the economic 
desires of the seller and buyer. The buyer wants goods shipped to 
itself or a consignee at a port it designates. The seller wants to 
deliver the goods for shipment at the most economically 
convenient port that will satisfy its contractual obligations. While 
in the majority of cases the transactions proceed smoothly, legions 
of recorded cases demonstrate that the risks of ocean transportation 
remain and thus the parties need to be prepared for litigations and 
other issues when delivery is less than perfect.89 
 
factory, producing ever-larger shares of global manufacturing output and absorbing 
enormous amounts of natural resources and intermediate goods. The container-shipping 
industry supported much of this trade: in 2015, China imported and exported 52 million 
20-foot equivalent units, a fourfold increase on the 13 million twenty-foot equivalent 
units (TEUs) of 2000”). 
88 See Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the 
Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 91 (2002). 
89 See generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 456–656 in ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 
(West Academic, 6th ed. 2018) (discussing common and private carriage, respectively). 
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Even with experienced carriers, shipping and logistics can take 
longer than a month, an interminable amount of time in the modern 
fashion cycle.90 Delays at any stage of production, including 
shipping, may disrupt an entire season.91 In August 2016, Hanjin 
Shipping Co. filed for bankruptcy in South Korea, leaving vessels 
out to sea and retailers without product.92 With Hanjin’s assets 
frozen, millions of dollars’ worth of merchandise being transported 
by dozens of vessels left floating in the ocean could not be 
obtained because the bankruptcy left Hanjin unable to pay the 
necessary tugboat, pilots, or stevedores.93 Approximately ninety 
vessels belonging to the Seoul-based company were denied entry 
to ports or terminals, frustrating access to cargo held in 500,000 
containers.94 The cost of shipping from China to the U.S. “jumped 
up to 50 percent in a single day.”95 Even companies lucky enough 
to avoid the Hanjin crisis directly were impacted by the logistical 
nightmare.96 Shippers of time sensitive cargos, such as fashion 
items, should be alert to the law governing recovery for delay-
holiday goods have far less value the day after the event. 
Moreover, the same shippers need to work with their brokers and 
 
90 See Lauren Sherman, The Secret Journey of a Fashion Piece — Part 3: Logistics 
and Supply Chain, BUS. OF FASHION (Oct. 14, 2014, 10:00AM), 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/intelligence/secret-journey-fashion-piece-
part-3-logistics-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/Y6A8-SADY]. 
91 See id. 
92 See Robert Jablon, Hanjin Bankruptcy Causes Global Shipping Chaos, Retail Fears, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sep. 2, 2016), https://apnews.com/2dd792899f214e789c219914e
030b379 [https://perma.cc/LFX4-P2JY]. 
93 Id.; see also Deborah Belgum, 2016 Newsmakers: Hanjin Bankruptcy Sinks a Lot of 
Importer’s Revenue Goals, CAL. APPAREL NEWS (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.apparelnews.net/news/2016/dec/08/2016-newsmakers-hanjin-bankruptcy-
sinks-lot-import/ [https://perma.cc/SGJ7-NXW4]. 
94 See Jackie Northam, Container Ships Stranded at Sea After South Korean Company 
Goes Bankrupt, NPR (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/09/08
/493157924/container-ships-stranded-at-sea-after-south-korean-company-goes-bankrupt 
[https://perma.cc/W7VH-SJSL]. 
95 Jablon, supra note 93. 
96 See Karl Plume, The ‘Ghost Fleet’ of Cargo Ships with Nowhere to Go Is Causing 
Freight Costs to Spike as Much as 50%, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-from-steaks-to-furniture-hanjin-shipping-collapse-to-
raise-freight-costs-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/8G35-CHJF] (“The American Apparel and 
Footwear Association said it expects gross margins to be pressured in the near term by 
the higher shipping prices and additional unloading fees.”). 
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insurers to make sure that their marine cargo insurance coverage 
responds to claims for delay and loss of market value even in the 
absence of physical damage or loss. 
Perhaps drones will solve the problem of drifting ships at sea, 
but that is unlikely soon. While the internet buzzed with 
excitement in December 2016 when Amazon released a video 
showing how it “made its first customer delivery by drone, 
carrying a package containing popcorn and a Fire TV video-
streaming device several miles to a two-story farmhouse near 
Cambridge, U.K.,”97 the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 
halted Amazon’s plan to use drones to complete Amazon Prime 
deliveries stateside.98 Even if drone deliveries were approved, they 
would likely lack the capacity to deliver larger items and be 
limited by battery.99 
Tradition air cargo, however, is another area of Amazon’s 
expansion.100 After establishing Amazon Air, the conglomerate 
claims that “one day seeing Prime Air vehicles will be as normal as 
seeing mail trucks on the road.”101 Amazon Air is a cargo freight 
delivery service with its $1.49 billion hub located in Hebron 
Kentucky, near Cincinnati.102 In late 2018, Amazon announced 
 
97 Georgia Wells & Laura Stevens, Amazon Conducts First Commercial Drone 
Delivery, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-conducts-
first-commercial-drone-delivery-1481725956 [https://perma.cc/KN82-BJAZ]. 
98 See April Glaser, Why Amazon is Testing Drone Delivery in the U.K. – and Not the 
U.S., RECODE (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.recode.net/2016/12/14/13955818/amazon-
drone-delivery-uk-us-faa-testing [https://perma.cc/BH8G-K38Y]. 
99 See Jonathan Vanian, Sorry, Drone Deliveries Aren’t Coming Soon, FORBES (Feb. 9, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/09/drone-deliveries-gartner-amazon-google/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZAZ-8CKL]. 
100 See generally Prime Air, AMAZON, https://www.aboutamazon.com/innovation
/prime-air [https://perma.cc/9B6F-92HV] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
101 See id. 
102 See Experts: Amazon Prime Air Could Bring up to 15K Jobs Over Time, 9 WCPO 
CINCINNATI (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.wcpo.com/news/transportation-development
/development/experts-amazon-prime-air-could-bring-up-to-15k-jobs-over-time 
[https://perma.cc/V9V6-D9CJ]; Chris Mayhew, CVG and Amazon Prime Air Growth 
Spurs Roads Construction, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (June 2, 2018), 
https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/local/boone-county/2018/06/02/amazon-cvg-
development-fuel-boone-county-road-construction/655604002/ [https://perma.cc/H9A2-
RNNH]. 
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that it would expand its fleet of forty planes to fifty.103 Although 
the fashion industry utilizes traditional air cargo, “it’s not only 
costly but also frowned upon by today’s environmentally 
conscious and carbon-footprint-minded consumers.”104 
Consequently, the industry typically relies upon air transportation 
for delivery of special, time-sensitive pieces such as Megan 
Markle’s wedding dress or an overnight shipment from Italy of 
Marc Jacobs’s collection for New York Fashion Week.105 Thus, 
the old-fashioned method of ocean transportation does and will 
continue to be an unavoidable way of doing business. While it may 
lack the intrigue of drones and even more traditional air 
transportation, Amazon’s entry into ocean freight shipping was 
momentous but the media attention around it intentionally quiet. 
Seeking financial rewards in a difficult economy, major ocean 
carriers such as Maersk and CMA CGM are capitalizing on the e-
commerce expectation of end-to-end intermodal delivery 
solutions.106 Amazon now endeavors to join and control the major 
carriers’ ranks. 
 
103 See Sarah Perez, Amazon Air Expands With 10 More Cargo Aircraft, Bringing Fleet 
to 50 planes, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 21, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/21/amazon-
air-expands-with-10-more-cargo-aircraft-bringing-fleet-to-50-planes/ 
[https://perma.cc/FFD3-GQJH]. 
104 Andria Chang, Tariffs Should Hasten Apparel Manufacturing’s Move Out of China 
and Back To U.S., Study Says, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andriacheng/2018/10/12/the-threat-of-higher-tariffs-has-
hastened-u-s-apparel-industrys-talk-on-nearshoring/#643a716b3efd 
[https://perma.cc/P8RK-HD57] (“While flying goods in from Asia is an option, it’s not 
only costly but also frowned upon by today’s environmentally conscious and carbon-
footprint-minded consumers.”). 
105 See Steven Kurutz, Worldnet is FedEx for the Fashion Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/fashion/worldnet-fashion-shipping.html 
[https://perma.cc/E7N8-9Z7W]. 
106 See generally Peter Tirschwell, E-commerce offers carriers opening to serve smaller 
BCOs, JOC (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.joc.com/international-logistics/e-commerce-fits-
small-shippers-carriers-growth-strategy_20170406.html [https://perma.cc/JG5N-KGGE]. 
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II. THE ECONOMY OF E-COMMERCE AND THE WORLDWIDE 
MARKETPLACE 
A. Transitions in Traditional Retail 
Unsentimentally but with alarm, trend monitors—both of the 
runway and stock market—predict the swansong of retail as we 
know it.107 In conjunction with an influx of millennial shoppers, 
consumers have adapted to and normalized online shopping. 
Simultaneously, traditional mall purchases continue to diminish. 
For example, Macy’s announced its plan to cut more than 10,000 
jobs and close sixty-eight stores in early January 2017.108 
Similarly, Lord & Taylor’s flagship Fifth Avenue store was sold to 
WeWork and no longer operates as a department store.109 
Nevertheless, “the [fashion] industry has grown at 5.5 percent 
annually . . . to now be worth an estimated $2.4 trillion.”110 
Approximately 940 million online shoppers are expected to spend 
almost $1 trillion on cross-border e-commerce transactions by 
2020.111 In fact, luxury online sales are projected to grow from 3% 
of sales in 2010 to 12% in 2020.112 
 
107 See The State of Fashion, BUS. OF FASHION at 17, (2018), 
https://cdn.businessoffashion.com/reports/The_State_of_Fashion_2018_v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZVZ-BGDR]. 
108 Associated Press, Macy’s to Cut More Than 10,000 Jobs and Close 68 Stores, BUS. 
OF FASHION (Jan. 4, 2017, 9:54PM), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news-
analysis/macys-to-cut-more-than-10000-jobs-and-close-68-stores 
[https://perma.cc/P9UU-KUHB]. 
109 See generally Pamela N. Danziger, Uptown/Downtown: The Changing Luxury 
Landscape of New York City, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2018/09/23/uptowndowntown-the-changing-
landscape-of-luxury-in-new-york-city/#6dd5d8a56531 [https://perma.cc/WN7P-UZZV]. 
110 IMRAN AMED ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., THE STATE OF FASHION 1 (2016). 
111 Id. at 24. 
112 Id. at 28; see also Chantal Fernandez, Report: LVMH to Launch Multi-Brand E-
Commerce Site, BUSINESS OF FASHION (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news-analysis/report-lvmh-to-launch-multi-
brand-e-commerce-site [https://perma.cc/FK7G-NZX9] (“While e-commerce still only 
makes up a small percentage of overall luxury goods sales, online sales grew four times 
faster than offline sales between 2009 and 2014. However, McKinsey & Company 
predicts it will triple to €70 billion by 2025 — representing 18 percent of total luxury 
sales.”). 
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Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton’s (“LVMH”) launch of a multi-
brand e-commerce site signals a historic moment not only in the 
timeline of the international conglomerate but the entire 
industry.113 Previously described as a “digital laggard,”114 LVMH 
began offering all of its seventy brands on one e-commerce site in 
March 2017 under the umbrella of Le Bon Marché, a Parisian 
department store it has owned since 1984.115 Despite tension and 
apprehension regarding e-commerce—particularly for heritage 
brands like Louis Vuitton—LVMH’s announcement demonstrates 
insight into the luxury industry’s movement towards digitalization. 
Most luxury and contemporary brands understand the need to 
advance their e-commerce sales to complete with Amazon both 
now and in the future. Yet, fashion brands and retailers cannot 
depend exclusively on e-commerce to maintain and develop 
revenue streams. They must also focus on how their merchandise, 
whether sold in stores on online, moves throughout the global 
marketplace. 
B. The Amazonian E-Commerce Elephant in the Room 
Amazon began its foray into the luxury fashion market in 2012 
with an advertisement “reminiscent of an American Vogue 
spread.”116 Attempting to appease the old guard, Amazon also 
sponsored the 2012 Met Gala. At that time, Amazon’s founder and 
chief executive, Jeff Bezos, indicated that his “company was 
making a ‘significant’ investment in fashion to convince top 
 
113 See Fernandez, supra note 112. In September 2015, LVHM hired Ian Rogers, a 
former Apple music executive, as its first chief digital office to invigorate its digital 
strategy. See Ben Sisario, Former Apple Music Executive Ian Rogers Move to LVMH, 
N.Y, TIMES (Sep. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/business/media/former-
apple-music-executive-ian-rogers-moves-to-lvmh.html [https://perma.cc/LM6E-RZMA]. 
114 Can LVMH Compete with Net-a-Porter?, BUSINESS OF FASHION (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/this-week-in-fashion/can-lvmh-compete-
with-net-a-porter?utm_source=BoF+Professional+Members&utm_campaign 
=4a0f7130c9-&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_ff3914e56a-4a0f7130c9-420584825 
[https://perma.cc/3FAH-3EYP]. 
115 See Fernandez, supra note 112. 
116 Richie Siegel, Decoding Amazon’s Fashion Ambitions, BUS. OF FASHION (Sep. 7, 
2016), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/fashion-tech/decoding-amazons-
fashion-ambitions [https://perma.cc/CLV7-XZFZ]. 
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brands that it wanted to work with them, not against them.”117 
While the Met Gala provided Amazon with access to industry 
insiders that might otherwise shun it, the sponsorship came at a 
substantial price. While “the amount of Amazon’s support was not 
disclosed, headline sponsorship of the Met Gala and exhibition is 
estimated to cost about $1 million, not a small sum, even for a 
giant like Amazon.”118 
Today, Amazon is lauded as the “biggest clothing seller 
online.”119 Dramatized headlines boldly state: “Amazon Eats the 
Department Store”120 and “Amazon is getting closer to crushing 
America’s biggest clothing stores.”121 Nevertheless, Amazon’s 
current clothing sales are predominately in the functional basics 
category.122 While certain contemporary brands agree to sell on 
Amazon, including Michael Kors, Vivienne Westwood, Catherine 
Malandrino, Tracy Reese, Kate Spade, French Connection, 7 for 
All Mankind, and Vince,123 most luxury and contemporary brands 
refuse to sell on the e-commerce platform. 
The chasm between Amazon and luxury is expansive. 
Amazon’s business depends on below-cost pricing.124 Today, off-
 
117 Stephanie Clifford, Amazon Leaps into High End of the Fashion Pool, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/business/amazon-plans-its-next-
conquest-your-closet.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/K453-FHL5]. 
118 See Is the Met Ball Becoming Fashion’s Biggest PR Platform?, BUSINESS OF 
FASHION (May 8, 2012), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/intelligence/is-the-
met-ball-becoming-fashions-biggest-pr-platform [https://perma.cc/Z6GJ-MF3X]. 
119 Shelly Banjo, Amazon is Now Eating All the Department Stores, Too, BLOOMBERG 
OPINION: GADFLY (Sep. 20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-09-
20/amazon-clothing-sales-could-soon-top-macy-s [https://perma.cc/VEP7-JJJV]. 
Walmart, with $24 billion in U.S. clothing sales, is America’s largest apparel seller. Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Hayley Peterson, Amazon is Getting Closer to Crushing America’s Biggest Clothing 
Stores, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-becomes-
the-biggest-clothing-retailer-in-the-us-2017-1 [https://perma.cc/R7LG-W2VA]. 
122 See Chavie Lieber, Amazon Wants to Dress You, RACKED (Apr. 4, 2017), 
http://www.racked.com/2017/4/4/14982426/amazon-fashion-clothes 
[https://perma.cc/35SJ-5WYE]. 
123 See Clifford, supra note 118; see also Banjo, supra note 120. 
124 See Walter Loeb, Amazon’s Pricing Strategy Makes Life Miserable for the 
Competition, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterloeb/2014
/11/20/amazons-pricing-strategy-makes-life-miserable-for-the-
competition/#629536425c60 [https://perma.cc/9NFE-RJW3]. 
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price retailing continues to expand, with an expected growth 
between six and eight percent by 2020.125 Discounting, however, 
“turns off luxury brands.”126 Amazon’s business thereby 
completely contradicts with luxury fashion’s anathema to off-
price.127 Consider the following anecdote. When Amazon first 
sponsored the Met Gala, “Mr. Bezos, the event’s honorary 
chairman, said that he was advised by Anna Wintour, Vogue’s 
editor, to wear a pocket square with his Tom Ford tuxedo.”128 
While that tuxedo is not available on Amazon Fashion,129 there 
were approximately 8000 alternative options for sale on the site.130 
Despite downturn in mall traffic, most luxury and 
contemporary fashion brands still refuse to work with Amazon. 
Even those that do sell on its e-commerce platform often limit 
merchandise to entry-level items.131 LVMH, for example, stated 
that “[w]e believe the business of Amazon does not fit with LVMH 
full stop and it does not fit with our brands. . . . There is no way we 
can do business with them for the time being.”132 Nevertheless, 
Amazon persistently pursues the luxury and contemporary fashion 
market.133 
 
125 See Lauren Sherman, After Decade of Growth, When Will Off-Price Hit Saturation 
Point?, BUSINESS OF FASHION (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.businessoffashion.com
/articles/intelligence/after-decade-of-growth-when-will-off-price-hit-saturation-point 
[https://perma.cc/9FNW-EUE7]. 
126 Siegel, supra note 116. 
127 That said, as the market continues to shift luxury brands are beginning to utilize off-
price channels to “differentiate their offering based on different demand segments.” 
Global Fashion & Luxury market Private Equity and Investors Survey 2016, DELOITTE 1, 
8 (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/sg/Documents/consumer-
business/sea-cip-global-fashion-luxury-pe-survey-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SPV-
MPMK]. 
128 Clifford, supra note 117. 
129 See id. 
130 As per a March 21, 2019 search of “tuxedo” under the men’s category on Amazon 
Fashion, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/amazon-fashion/b?ie=UTF8&node=
7141123011 [https://perma.cc/A393-USVY] (input “tuxedo” into search field). 
131 See Lieber, supra note 122. 
132 LVMH Says No Way It Will Do Business with Amazon, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/10/11/lvmh-no-business-amazon/ [https://perma.cc/44GK-
KEAE]. 
133 See Lieber, supra note 122. 
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III. OCEAN TRANSPORTATION IS THE NEW BLACK 
Most likely, fashion will become merely another box checked 
off in Amazon’s quest for complete dominance across industries. A 
“titan of twenty-first century commerce,” Amazon is not only “a 
retailer” but also “a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics 
network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a 
major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion 
designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud 
server space.”134 Simply put, Amazon’s “structure and conduct 
pose anticompetitive concerns.”135 
Lina Khan, in a 2017 Yale Law Journal article that went as 
“viral as dense legal scholarship can go,”136 discussed how current 
U.S. antitrust laws are “unequipped to capture the architecture of 
market power in the modern economy” specifically in light of 
Amazon’s cross-industry dominance.137 Khan posits that 
Amazon’s behemoth business structure creates particular 
anticompetitive concerns involving predatory pricing and vertical 
integration.138 While Khan notes that Amazon’s expansion into 
delivery creates particular antitrust concerns involving vertical 
integration, she does not discuss the magnitude of Amazon’s foray 
into ocean shipping and corollary antitrust exemption concerns.139 
The aforementioned sensationalized conversation regarding 
whether Amazon’s drone squadrons will ever take flight fails to 
consider the much less racy ocean carrier component of its global 
 
134 Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017). 
135 Id. 
136 Robinson Meyer, How to Fight Amazon (Before You Turn 29), THE ATLANTIC (July 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/lina-khan-antitrust/561743 
[https://perma.cc/T648-4ASE]. 
137 See Khan, supra note 134, at 710. 
138 See id. As a solution, Khan recommends that the U.S. move away from consumer 
welfare focused antitrust laws and instead focus on maintaining competition. 
139 Id. at 778 (“Amazon now owns four thousand truck trailers and has also signed 
contracts for container ships, planes, and drones. As of October 2016, Amazon had leased 
at least forty jets. Former employees say Amazon’s long-term goal is to circumvent UPS 
and FedEx altogether, though the company itself has said it is looking only to supplement 
its reliance on these firms, not supplant them . . . By overlooking structural factors like 
bargaining power, modern antitrust doctrine fails to address this type of threat to 
competitive markets.”). 
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logistics business.140 In 2015, Amazon generated combined 
revenues of $107 billion.141 The year before, it spent $11.5 billion 
on shipping, an expense that has risen for the online retailer every 
year since 2009.142 During the second quarter of 2016 alone, 
Amazon’s shipping expenses rose 44% while sales only rose 
31%.143 
According to Citigroup Inc., Amazon “could save $1.1 billion 
annually if it stopped using UPS and FedEx.”144 Moreover, 
“[k]eeping packages under its own control just over longer 
distances could save Amazon around $3 or more on a typical 
delivery.”145 In June 2016, Deutsche Bank released a report 
regarding Amazon’s logistics strategy.146 Setting out steps for 
Amazon’s proposed new supply chain, Deutsche Bank 
recommended that: 
 Amazon charters ships to speed up the sourcing 
of goods from China, 
 Amazon sets up a mega-fulfillment centers near 
several ports in China (or in other APAC 
regions where factories spring up in the future) 
that can manage sorting of goods into location-
specific pallets — at a freight-consolidation 
facility, 
 
140 See Spencer Soper, Amazon Building Global Delivery Business to Take On Alibaba, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-09
/amazon-is-building-global-delivery-business-to-take-on-alibaba-ikfhpyes 
[https://perma.cc/6TCC-9AUM]. 
141 See Siegel, supra note 116. 
142 See Greg Bensinger & Laura Stevens, Amazon’s Newest Ambition: Competing 
Directly With UPS and FedEx, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/amazons-newest-ambitioncompeting-directly-with-ups-and-fedex-1474994758 
[https://perma.cc/8TAU-CHSL]. 
143 See Greg Bensinger, Amazon Reveals ‘Prime Air’ Cargo Jet, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-reveals-prime-air-cargo-jet-1470378818 
[https://perma.cc/43WJ-F2EM]. 
144 See Bensinger and Stevens, supra note 142. 
145 Id. 
146 See Devin Leonard, Will Amazon Kill FedEx?, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-amazon-delivery/ [https://perma.cc/QLJ6-
T3X9]. 
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 The ships serve as “active sortation centers” 
while moving product across the Pacific and 
Atlantic, potentially taking advantage of the 
“anticipatory package shipping” patent from 
2013, but on boats (vs. trucks) whereby Amazon 
predicts demand in every coastal population 
center and has inventory-in-transit, 
 As orders come in, Amazon sorts items on the 
ships and in smaller sortation centers on the 
other side of coasts — i.e., “freight 
deconsolidation” facilities, the orders are 
labeled and loaded directly into trailers 
eliminating intermediate storage, solving one of 
the biggest inefficiencies in today’s logistics 
supply chain, 
Orders are routed using self-driving trailers to local sortation 
centers or drop off points for Amazon’s own carrier, USPS, UPS, 
and FedEx for last mile delivery.147 
Since 2016, Amazon has gained “more control over its delivery 
chain from factories in China through U.S. ports to sprawling 
suburban warehouses and neighborhood package-sorting 
centers.”148 Stated differently, Amazon envisions and endeavors 
for complete vertical integration. 
Amazon began using branded trailers for truck deliveries in 
late 2015.149 At the time, the company indicated that “the new 
trucks will serve as additional delivery power and that it will not 
cancel, or for that matter compete with, its existing partnerships 
 
147 Myles Udland, Deutsche Bank Lays Out a Radical Vision for the Future of 
Amazon’s Shipping Operations, BUS. INSIDER DEUTSCHLAND (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.de/amazons-logistics-re-imagined-by-deutsche-bank-2016-
6?platform=hootsuite&utm_content=32029983&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitt
er?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/8Y3Z-Z9UH]. 
148 See Bensinger & Stevens, supra note 142. 
149 See Leena Rao, Amazon To Roll Out A Fleet Of Branded Trailer Trucks, FORTUNE 
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/04/amazon-trucks/ [https://perma.cc/D3R3-
ZEFA]. 
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with traditional shippers like FedEx and UPS.”150 These initial 
trailers were first used to deliver goods between Amazon’s 
warehouses, not to consumers, the “core business of FedEx and 
UPS.”151 
Showing successful savings, the company quickly thereafter 
entered the air transportation market, as mentioned above. In 
March 2016, Amazon leased twenty planes from Air Transport 
Services.152 A few months later in May, it announced its deal to 
lease twenty Boeing planes from Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings 
Inc.153 These acquisitions further position Amazon directly against 
its current logistics business partners, FedEx, UPS, and even the 
U.S. Postal Service.154 
In its latest attempt to build-out its logistics effort, Amazon 
began providing ocean-freight services.155 Although “[t]he 
company doesn’t own or operate ships,” Amazon “is openly acting 
as a global freight forwarder and third-party logistics provider, 
categories of companies that book space on ocean vessels and 
truck goods between ports and warehouses.”156 In November 2016, 
Beijing Century Joyo Courier Service Co, a Chinese affiliate of 
Amazon.com, registered with the Federal Maritime Commission 
(“FMC”)157 for the status of both freight forwarder and 
 
150 See Reem Nasr, Amazon: Additional Deliveries with Our Own Truck Fleet, CNBC 
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/04/amazon-additional-deliveries-with-our-
own-truck-fleet.html [https://perma.cc/TG87-BU8W]. 
151 Id. 
152 See Leslie Hook & Robert Writght, Amazon Leases 20 Boeing 767 Freight Jets for 
Air Cargo Programme, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6f3867e8-
e617-11e5-a09b-1f8b0d268c39 [https://perma.cc/72YS-P97U]. 
153 See Bensinger, supra note 143. 
154 See Alex Fitzpatrick, See Amazon’s Massive New ‘Prime Air’ Cargo Jet Plane, 
TIME (Aug. 5, 2016), http://time.com/4440542/amazon-one-airplane-fedex-ups/ 
[https://perma.cc/VEX2-XNKY]. 
155 See Laura Stevens, Amazon Expands into Ocean Freight, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-expands-into-ocean-freight-1485357884?
mod=e2tw [https://perma.cc/5DJH-52BA]. 
156 Id. 
157 The FMC carries out the regulatory process for the common carriage of goods by 
water in the foreign commerce of the U.S. established by the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 
U.S.C. §§ 40101–41309), discussed supra note 49. 
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NVOCC.158Although the ocean transportation component has been 
active since October 2016, only in January 2017 did Amazon begin 
posting rates for services traditionally handled by global freight 
companies.159 By mid-2017, Amazon was already importing 
between ten and fifteen containers per week on behalf of other 
customers and 350 containers per week for its own use from 
China.160 
Publicly, Amazon states that expansion into logistics is 
necessary to supplement already existing third-party services so 
orders can be delivered more efficiently, especially during busy 
holiday seasons.161 Yet, “[s]hipping has always been at the core of 
Amazon’s strategic investments.”162 Furthermore, Amazon’s 
business model focuses on wide expansion rather than substantial 
profits. In fact, Amazon was not even profitable in its first six 
years of existence.163 
 
158 Ryan Petersen, Introducing Ocean Freight by Amazon; Ecommerce Giant Has 
Registered to Provide Ocean Freight Services, FLEXPORT BLOG, 
https://www.flexport.com/blog/amazon-ocean-freight-forwarder/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZZY-M95R] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019); see also Peter Buxbaum, 
Amazon Now Moving into Ocean Shipping, GLOBAL TRADE MAG. (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/news/amazon-now-moving-into-
ocean-shipping [https://perma.cc/QZK8-AX6X]. 
159 See Stevens, supra note 9. 
160 See Leslie Hook, Amazon’s China Logistics Push to Pile Pressure on Rival 
Shippers, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/71f989c6-14ec-11e7-
80f4-13e067d5072c [https://perma.cc/H8E7-S8F7]. 
161 See Brad Stone, Amazon’s Grand Plan to Avoid Holiday Delivery Snafus Again, 
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 26, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-
26/amazons-grand-plan-to-avoid-holiday-delivery-snafus-again [https://perma.cc/76AJ-
F7SV]; see also Adam Lashinsky, How Alibaba’s Jack Ma Is Building a Truly Global 
Retail Empire, FORTUNE (Mar. 24, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/24/jack-ma-alibaba-
china-ecommerce-world-greatest-leaders/ [https://perma.cc/KD6A-K9P9] (“In China, this 
meant investing in a network of logistics companies called Cainiao—Alibaba owns 
47%—that vastly improved on the meager capabilities of the government’s postal 
delivery system.”). 
162 Farhad Manjoo, Think Amazon’s Drone Delivery Idea Is a Gimmick? Think Again, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.supplychain247.com/article
/maersk_alibaba_roll_out_ocean_cargo_booking_partnership/yusen_logistics 
[https://perma.cc/KC2U-UTE8]. 
163 See Khan, supra note 134, at 712. 
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Maintaining an expansionist business model, Amazon rose to 
e-commerce dominance. It now seeks to control the logistics 
industry: 
Amazon has translated its dominance as an online 
retailer into significant bargaining power in the 
delivery sector, using it to secure favorable 
conditions from third-party delivery companies. 
This in turn has enabled Amazon to extend its 
dominance over other retailers by creating the 
Fulfillment-by-Amazon service and establishing its 
own physical delivery capacity. This illustrates how 
a company can leverage its dominant platform to 
successfully integrate into other sectors, creating 
anticompetitive dynamics. Retail competitors are 
left with two undesirable choices: either try to 
compete with Amazon at a disadvantage or become 
reliant on a competitor to handle delivery and 
logistics.164 
Amazon does not want to supplement the logistics services 
currently provided by FedEx, UPS, and DHL. Rather: 
Amazon wants to bypass these brokers, amassing 
inventory from thousands of merchants around the 
world and then buying space on trucks, planes and 
ships at reduced rates. Merchants will be able to 
book cargo space online or via mobile devices, 
creating what Amazon described as a “one click-
ship for seamless international trade and 
shipping.”165 
Entering the shipping industry was not a way for Amazon to 
reduce its exorbitant shipping costs and obtain a new revenue 
stream.166 The ocean freight business, “a notoriously unautomated 
industry,” allows Amazon to almost achieve complete vertical 
integration. In other words, Amazon’s logistics division serves as a 
 
164 Id. at 744. 
165 Soper, supra note 140. 
166 See Bensinger & Stevens, supra note 142. 
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way for the company to completely control access to and financing 
of the global marketplace.167 
It remains to be seen how Amazon will take to the seas since 
risks arising from ocean transportation are inevitable. Amazon 
does not want to follow the public disasters suffered, as a matter of 
illustration, by the oil supermajors,168 who long operated profitable 
tankers in international trade. Historically, oil majors controlled 
not only the production and distribution of their products, but also 
the international transportation of oil worldwide in easily identified 
seagoing tankers. The image of MT Amoco Cadiz in 1978,169 MT 
Exxon Valdez in 1989,170 and BP’s Deepwater Horizon in 2010171 
are brutal reminders of the impact of disasters on brand names. 
After the crude oil from MT Exxon Valdez fouled the pristine 
Alaskan waters and shore, the oil majors finally decided to exit the 
oil transportation market. Analogously, Amazon must evaluate 
how much risk it will accept to brand its ships and containers in 
international ocean transportation. For example, would Amazon be 
willing to endure weeks or months of negative publicity while one 
of its ships was grounded outside a major port presenting an oil 
pollution risk or if another carrier’s vessel was on fire with 
 
167 Zvi Schreiber, Is Logistics About To Get Amazon’ed?, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 29, 
2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/29/is-logistics-about-to-get-amazoned/ [https:/
/perma.cc/CP6E-5WWM]. 
168 The “supermajors” are a group of multinational oil companies given the moniker 
due to their size, age, and market position. See Tom Bergin, Oil Majors’ Output Growth 
Hinges On Strategy Shift, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
oilmajors-production/oil-majors-output-growth-hinges-on-strategy-shift-
idUSL169721220080801 [https://perma.cc/8URP-9REN]. 
169 See Amoco Cadiz, NOAA: INCIDENT NEWS, https://incidentnews.noaa.gov
/incident/6241 [https://perma.cc/Q6CR-H8J3] (last accessed Jan. 19, 2019) (The Amoco 
Cadiz ran aground on March 16, 1978 off the coast of Brittany, France, spilling its entire 
cargo of 1,619,048 barrels of oil into the sea). 
170 See Alan Taylor, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 25 Years Ago Today, THE ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/03/the-exxon-valdez-oil-spill-
25-years-ago-today/100703/ [https://perma.cc/Q5ML-ZT8E] (On March 24, 1989, the oil 
tanker Exxon Valdez, full of crude oil, struck a reef in Alaska’s Prince William Sounds, 
releasing eleven million gallons of oil). 
171 See David Barstow, David Rohde, & Stephanie Saul, Deepwater Horizon’s Final 
Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/26spill.html 
[https://perma.cc/AP9T-LR7D] (An April 20, 2010 explosion on the Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico, leased by BP, resulted in the largest marine oil spill in 
history). 
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Amazon branded ocean containers clearly visible on the main 
deck? Considering these potential risks, perhaps Amazon will elect 
to invest its capital in non-branded, leased ocean-containers and 
chartered containerships or will buy the containers and ships and 
charter them to other entities to operate. 
IV. U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. Legal Monopolies 
As America’s economy developed in the late 19th century, the 
government began implementing competition laws. Congress 
enacted the Sherman Act of 1890172 to protect competitive 
markets.173 In 1914, the U.S. enacted the Clayton Act174 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.175 Since then, U.S. competition 
laws “have had the same basic objective: to protect the process of 
competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are 
strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices 
down, and keep quality up.”176 
The Sherman Act “outlaws ‘every contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade,’ and any ‘monopolization, 
attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to 
monopolize.’”177 It does not prohibit every restraint on trade, only 
those which are found unreasonable.178 Certain actions such as 
horizontal price fixing are considered per se violations under the 
Sherman Act.179 Nevertheless, vertical integration, which arises 
when “two or more successive stages of production and/or 
 
172 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
173 See Albert A. Foer, AAI Working Paper 06-04 (United States Antitrust Inst., Apr. 
2006), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/502.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3N3-JBT6]. 
Even before the passage of the Sherman Act, certain states had passed antitrust laws. Id.  
174 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2012). 
175 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
176 The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/3YHV-
ECXT]. 
177 Id. 
178 See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
179 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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distribution of a product are combined under the same control,” is 
subject to less stringent regulation.180 
The Clayton Act was passed to address practices that the 
Sherman Act did not clearly prohibit, including mergers and 
acquisitions where the effect “may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”181 As amended by 
the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,182 the Clayton Act further 
prohibits certain discriminatory prices, services, and allowances in 
dealings between merchants.183 In 1976, the Clayton Act was again 
amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act184 
which requires companies to notify the government of their plans 
in advance of large mergers or acquisitions.185 
Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair 
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”186 It also created an independent federal agency, the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). This FTC strives to protect 
consumers and ensure a strong competitive market by enforcing 
various consumer protection and antitrust laws. It specifically 
seeks to protect consumers and the market from harmful business 
and anticompetitive practices. 
While the FTC protects consumer interests, citizen 
protectionism was not the sole impetus for antitrust law 
development in America. Instead, “Congress enacted antitrust laws 
to rein in the power of industrial trusts, the large business 
organizations that had emerged in the late nineteenth century. 
Responding to a fear of concentrated power, antitrust sought to 
distribute it.”187 Thus, monopolization is explicitly prohibited by 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
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181 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012). 
182 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). 
183 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 176. 
184 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2012). 
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person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished 
by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or 
by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both 
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.188 
U.S. antitrust laws were designed and interpreted to reflect that 
the market would become anticompetitive if dominated by only a 
handful of large companies because: 
 monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures 
enable dominant actors to coordinate with 
greater ease and subtlety, facilitating conduct 
like price-fixing, market division, and tacit 
collusion; 
 monopolistic and oligopolistic firms can use 
their existing dominance to block new entrants; 
and 
 monopolistic and oligopolistic firms have 
greater bargaining power against consumers, 
suppliers, and workers, which enables them to 
hike prices and degrade service and quality 
while maintaining profits.189 
Over time, however, U.S. antitrust doctrine shifted to favor the 
Chicago School of Economics’ price theory. Developed at the 
University of Chicago in the 1940s, this theory favors a free 
market with minimal government intervention. The economic 
scholars of the Chicago School argue that “rational economic 
actors working within the confines of the market seek to maximize 
profits by combining inputs in the most efficient manner. A failure 
to act in this fashion will be punished by the competitive forces of 
the market.”190 As academic economic theories about antitrust 
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shifted toward the Chicago School’s teachings, the government 
began to ignore monopolization concerns.191 
Whereas U.S. antitrust laws were originally passed to prevent 
monopolization so as to thwart anticompetitive practices like 
vertical integration, adoption of the Chicago School theory led 
enforcers to “largely abandon section 2 monopolization claims.”192 
“Over the eight years of the Bush Administration, the Justice 
Department filed no monopolization cases. [As of July 18, 2012], 
the Obama Administration [had] filed only one case, hardly 
evidencing a major shift in tactics.”193 It remains unclear how 
antitrust enforcement will continue to shift under the Trump 
administration. On the campaign trail, President Trump suggested 
a “very aggressive approach to antitrust.”194 Prior to politics, he 
was personally involved in a several antitrust matters.195 
Concurrently, his administration emphasizes decreased 
government regulation which has resulted in less antitrust 
enforcement.196 Commentators have suggested, however, that the 
DOJ’s antitrust division policy “has consistently promoted the 
interests of the biggest tech companies.”197 
B. The Current Legal Landscape of the Maritime Exemptions 
Antitrust exemptions began with the maritime industry.198 “The 
Shipping Act of 1916 is the oldest surviving U.S. statutory antitrust 
 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 738. 
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Under Trump, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes
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195 See Salop & Shapiro, supra note 194. 
196 See id. 
197 See Matthew Buck & Sandeep Vaheesan, Trump’s Big Tech Bluster, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/opinion/trump-antitrust-laws.html 
[https://perma.cc/5KHM-WUQN]. 
198 The other well-known antitrust exemption is for professional baseball. See Fed. 
Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see also David Greenberg, 
Baseball’s Con Game, SLATE (July 19, 2002) http://www.slate.com/articles
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exemption.”199 The world’s ocean liner trade did not exist when 
the Sherman Act was adopted in 1890. As steam ship technology 
advanced, ocean transportation quickly grew. To alleviate over-
tonnage200 issues, “which threatened liner operators’ large 
investments in ships and facilities,” the ocean “carriers began to 
cooperate among themselves.”201 The ocean carrier business, based 
upon these cooperative ventures, developed to form shipping 
cartels.202 The Sherman Act did not clearly govern the shipping 
industry because: 1) ocean liners were not contemplated at the time 
of its enactment, and 2) maritime shipping is inherently 
international in nature.203 Due to the lack of clarity in the law 
coupled with “the shipping business’ vital importance and unique 
characteristics,” the legislature deemed separate maritime antitrust 
regulation necessary.204 
The Shipping Act of 1916, while outlawing specified 
monopolistic practices, also provided major exemptions for the 
maritime shipping industry: 
[The law] conferred an exemption from the antitrust 
laws for conference agreements on shipping rates, 
pooling arrangements, and shipping route 
allocations, so long as those agreements were first 
submitted to and approved by the newly created 
U.S. Shipping Board (the body that eventually 
became the FMC).205 
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199 Competition Issues in Liner Shipping, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., at 2 
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200 Tonnage refers to the capacity of space on an ocean freight ship. Thus, over tonnage 
refers to when there is too much empty space on a vessel. See Overtonnaging, GLOB. 
FORWARDING (Nov. 11, 2013), https://globalforwarding.com/blog/overtonnaging 
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Since the enactment of the Shipping Act of 1916, maritime-
specific antitrust exemptions continue to develop as the industry 
evolves. 
As with the Sherman Act, the rise of the Chicago School of 
Economics substantially impacted the maritime exemptions.206 In 
1984, the Shipping Act was substantially altered. The Shipping Act 
of 1984,207 in addition to revising the antitrust exemption for 
carrier agreements and streamlining regulatory processes for such 
agreement, “abolished the FMC’s public interest standard for 
reviewing carrier agreements.”208 Thus, the only way an agreement 
can be challenged as anticompetitive is if the FMC compels a court 
to enjoin the agreement. Such legal enjoinment will occur if the 
proposed agreements will “by a reduction in competition . . . 
produce an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or an 
unreasonable increase in transportation cost.”209 In an effort to 
further catch up to technological advances in the ocean shipping 
sector, specifically containerization and increased preferences for 
intermodal transport,210 the Shipping Act was further deregulated 
through the 1998 enactment of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act 
(“OSRA”).211 
Today, the Shipping Act serves to: 
 Establish a nondiscriminatory regulatory 
process for the common carriage of goods by 
water in the foreign commerce of the United 
States with a minimum of government 
intervention and regulatory costs; 
 Provide an efficient and economic 
transportation system in the ocean commerce of 
 
206 See Khan, supra note 134, at 718–21. 
207 46 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012). 
208 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., supra note 200, at 3 (“The FMC construed 
the ‘public interest’ standard in the 1961 amendment to mean that agreements that would 
violate policies of the antitrust laws were prima facie contrary to the public interest, and 
proponents had the burden of showing that they were justified by transportation need or 
regulatory purposes.”). 
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210 Nesterowicz, supra note 201, at 63. 
211 46 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1719 (2012). 
2019] CONTROLLING CARGO 517 
 
the United States that is, insofar as possible, in 
harmony with, and responsive to, international 
shipping practices; 
 Encourage the development of an economically 
sound and efficient liner fleet of vessels of the 
United States capable of meeting national 
security needs; and 
 Promote the growth and development of United 
States exports through competitive and efficient 
ocean transportation and by placing a greater 
reliance on the marketplace.212 
In an attempt to facilitate economical and efficient ocean 
commerce, “[t]he Act took a free market economy approach, 
opening up the market to free competition and turning away from 
the previous, regulatory approach.”213 While still subject to 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) prosecution for jointly fixing rate, 
under the exceptions, “container lines that belong to discussion 
agreement can meet to discuss and agree on voluntary rate 
guidelines.”214 Recently, however, the U.S. has become much 
more active in regulating anticompetitive action in the ocean 
shipping carrier sector. 
C. Maritime Antitrust Exemption in Action 
Li & Fung, “the world’s biggest sourcing company, with 
turnover last year [2016] approaching $21bn,” provides the fashion 
industry full service supply chain management.215 According to the 
company, it “offer[s] deep expertise in designing and developing 
private label products from initial product design through 
development to final delivery, whether it is for fast fashion, ready 
 
212 46 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012).  
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to wear accessories or gifts.”216 In 2014, Li & Fung developed a 
business expansion plan involving the acquisition of China 
Container Line (“CCL”), an ocean freight forwarding business, “to 
generate more bargaining power via larger volumes, providing cost 
savings on shipping of 5 to 15 per cent.”217 Within six months of 
the acquisition of CCL, Li & Fung’s logistic sector operating profit 
increased 31%.218 William Fung, Li & Fung’s group chairman, 
stated that “[t]he successful integration of the newly acquired 
freight forwarding business will accelerate the growth of the 
logistics business and provide synergies with the rest of our 
businesses.”219 
LF Logistics, a subsidiary of Li & Fung, now provides ocean 
freight forwarding services.220 Based in Shanghai, it operates as a 
foreign-based NVOCC registered with the FMC along with a 
licensed NVOCC located in Jamaica, Queens, New York. LF 
Logistics created a profitable new revenue stream for its parent 
company.221 Nevertheless, within the few years since its creation, it 
was subjected to U.S. antitrust regulation. 
Through its own prosecutorial arm, the Bureau of Enforcement, 
the FMC investigates potential violations of the Shipping Act and 
FMC regulations.222 After conducting a series of investigations 
into allegedly anticompetitive violations, the FMC announced that 
it collected $962,500.00 in civil penalty payments from 
compromise agreements on December 15, 2016.223 Included 
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among the ten settling parties were LF Logistics (China) Ltd. and 
LF Logistics USA, LLC, subsidiaries of Li & Fung.224 Pursuant to 
the Compromise Agreement entered into by LF Logistics (China) 
Ltd. and LF Logistics USA, LLC with the FMC, Li & Fung’s 
logistics subsidiaries agreed to settle for $180,000 rather than risk 
litigation.225 
The Compromise Agreement states: 
Between May 1, 2014 and May 31, 2016, LF 
Logistics (China) Co., Ltd. and LF Logistics USA 
LLC knowingly and willfully obtained ocean 
transportation for property at less than the rates and 
charges that would otherwise be applicable by the 
device or means of improperly utilizing rates 
limited to certain “named accounts” in service 
contracts with United Arab Shipping Company 
(UASC), CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd AG 
(Hapag), among other carriers; and 
During the same time period stated above, LF 
Logistics (China) Co., Ltd. and LF Logistics USA 
LLC knowingly and willfully improperly allowed 
other ocean transportation intermediaries (OTIs) to 
access certain service contracts with UASC, CMA 
CGM, and Hapag, among other carriers, to which 
such other OTIs were not signatories or affiliates 
and, pursuant to such device or means, said OTIs 
obtained ocean transportation for property from 
such ocean carriers at less than the rates or charges 
otherwise applicable.226 
 
Although in entering the Compromise Agreement, LF Logistics 
China and USA did not admit to violations of the Shipping Act of 
1984 or FMC Regulations, the Agreement suggests that the Li & 
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225 See Fed. Maritime Comm’n, Compromise Agreement, FMC FILE NO. 17194 (last 
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Fung subsidiaries engaged in anticompetitive actions. The FMC 
uses compromise agreements not only to address past violations, 
but also to “deter similar conduct throughout the industry.”227 
Around the time that Li & Fung developed its freight 
forwarding business, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”), a forum for governments to discuss 
economic development, began investigating developments in the 
maritime industry and related antitrust impacts.228 On November 
22, 2015, the OECD hosted a roundtable discussion on competition 
issues in the ocean liner shipping industry. Acknowledging “the 
peculiarity of the regulatory history of the liner shipping sector, 
which has been governed by agreements among competitors for a 
very long time,” the OECD discussion suggests that because of the 
cartel-like nature of the industry, there must be increased antitrust 
regulation.229 Although there is no single monopoly within the 
liner shipping sector: 
Liner shipping services are nonetheless very 
concentrated on the hands of a few top carriers. The 
top five carriers in the market - Maersk, MSC 
(Mediterranean Shipping Company), the CMA-
CGM Group, Hapag-Lloyd and Evergreen line - 
account for about half of the market capacity, with 
the remainder being dispersed among many smaller 
players . . . . In what concerns costs features, the 
industry is characterized by high fixed costs and 
economies of scale in vessel size. Economies of 
scale in vessel size drove one of the most important 
trends in the industry – a trend towards increasing 
vessel size . . . Between 2000 and 2014, the industry 
experienced a trend towards cost consolidation and 
increasing concentration, such that the capacity 
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share of the top 5, top 10, top 15 and top 20 carriers 
in the industry has been increasing.230 
In sum and substance, the OECD reinforced that competition 
within the industry is vital for global transportation and expressed 
concern regarding lagging U.S. enforcement. 
In 2017, a notable case regarding maritime antitrust 
exemptions reached the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In In re 
Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., purchasers of vehicles 
alleged that ocean common carriers entered into “secret” 
agreements that were not filed with the FMC to fix transportation 
prices and reduce service capacity in violation of both federal and 
state antitrust laws.231 After the defendant ocean common carriers 
moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of immunity from 
federal antitrust liability pursuant to the Shipping Act, the District 
of New Jersey dismissed the action with prejudice.232 On appeal, 
the Third Circuit examined the Shipping Act.233 The Court held 
that the purpose of the Shipping Act is “to promote economically 
sound, evenhanded, and efficient ocean commerce that responds to 
international shipping practices,” which is achieved in part by 
limited antitrust exemptions.234 Accordingly, the Third Circuit, 
quoting the Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, held that Shipping Act expressly immunized 
agreements that were filed, or which should have been filed, with 
the FMC from federal antitrust laws.235 The Third Circuit held that 
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although “[t]here is no dispute that operating under unfiled price 
fixing and/or market allocation agreements is prohibited under §§ 
40301 and 40302 of the Shipping Act,” the Shipping Act 
nevertheless barred the plaintiffs from obtaining relief against the 
defendant ocean carriers.236 In other words, the Third Circuit held 
that although the defendant carriers’ actions could be actionable by 
or before the FMC, they were immunized from Clayton Act 
regulation by the Shipping Act.237 
A few months later, in March 2017, DOJ antitrust investigators 
raided a biannual “Box Club” meeting, more formally known as 
the meeting of the International Council of Containership 
Operators, in San Francisco.238 DOJ served subpoenas on Maersk 
and Hapag-Lloyd, two major industry players, among others.239 
The subpoenas, all issued on foreign entities, demanded 
“documents ranging from the activities of the Box Club to how 
capacity is shared within the alliances and how pricing is set for 
world-wide trades.”240 This investigation is considered to be “one 
of the most wide-ranging inquiries regarding competition and 
compliance in the maritime industry.”241 
Significantly, the raid came a few days before new European 
and Asian carrier alliances were set to become effective.242 Early 
reports regarding the DOJ investigation suggest that the raids 
occurred because of applications to the FMC seeking permission to 
allow new European and Asian carrier alliances to collectively 
negotiate with tug boat operators, fuel suppliers, and other service 
providers.243 In fact, on November 22, 2016, the DOJ’s Antitrust 
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Division wrote a letter to the FMC providing comments to the 
filling of an alliance agreement.244 The Antitrust Division 
expressed concerns regarding the creation of new alliances: 
The Alliance Agreement raises a number of 
significant competitive concerns, particularly as it 
comes on the heels of the recently approved 
OCEAN Alliance. The creation of these two new 
alliances will result in a significant increase in 
concentration in the industry as the existing four 
major shipping alliances are replaced by only three. 
This increase in concentration and reduction in the 
number of shipping alliances will likely facilitate 
coordination in an industry that is already prone to 
collusion.245 
Moreover, the DOJ Antitrust Division urged the FMC to 
carefully consider the anticompetitive effects of alliance formation 
in light of the immunity the agreement could enjoy under the 
Shipping Act exemptions.246 
V. CHARTING THE COURSE FORWARD 
The Shipping Act’s antitrust immunities and procedural 
complexities have recently been debated. In the spring of 2017, 
Congressman Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., the ranking member of the 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and Congressman 
Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation, began expressing concern 
about antitrust exceptions for the maritime industry in light of 
industry consolidation247 Although the carriers, especially the top 
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three in U.S. trade (CMA CGM, Mediterranean Shipping Co., and 
Maersk Line), want to continue to benefit from U.S. antitrust 
exceptions, “marine terminals, tugboat operators, and stevedores 
are lobbying Congress to bar alliances from being able to jointly 
contract with them.”248 These third-party service providers believe 
that the carrier alliances allow the exchange of sensitive 
information, coordination, and collusion while contracting for their 
services.249 
On May 3, 2017, a hearing was held before the Subcommittee 
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure regarding, in part, the Shipping 
Act of 1984.250 The testimony of the Hon. Michael A. Khouri, 
FMC Acting Chairman, highlights the fear that as the industry 
consolidates—the number of major shipping lines has fallen to 13 
and the number of major carrier alliances serving U.S. trades is 
only three—the anticompetitive effects of the alliances 
increases.251 U.S. Rep. John Garamendi, a Democrat from 
California, stated that “there has been a very significant change in 
the nature of the industry since the last amendment to the Ocean 
Shipping Act . . . The emergence of all of the alliances and the 
significant power they have as a result of those alliances raises a 
question of antitrust, anticompetitive activity.”252 He continued: 
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It is clear to me—and I think to many members of 
this committee—that we have a situation evolving 
in which oligarchic power is in existence and can be 
used to the detriment of competition, pricing, and a 
competitive environment. It seems to me that we 
need to modify the law, which is now almost 30 
years old so that we recognize the realities of the 
industry as it exists today. I am particularly troubled 
by the language . . . that allows the alliances to 
provide amongst themselves all the information 
they need to collude—independently, but 
nonetheless, collude, prior to independent 
negotiations. I think that is wrong. I think we need 
to change the law.253 
He concluded, “[t]he bottom line in all of this is the law is not 
up to date with the realities of the industry, as it exists today.”254 
On December 4, 2018, the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2018 (“2018 Coast Guard Act”) was signed 
into law, amending, inter alia, certain Shipping Act prohibitions on 
anticompetitive behavior.255 Specifically concerning antitrust, the 
amendments to the Shipping Act were crafted to prohibit 
anticompetitive actions that would negatively impact U.S. 
maritime business in light of the overall consolidation of the 
industry and specifically the emergence of alliances.256 
Significantly, the FMC now is required to conduct an annual 
analysis into to competitive impacts of ocean common carrier 
alliances.257 The amendments further focus on the alliances’ 
impacts on certain covered services obtained at U.S. maritime 
terminals.258 Alliances cannot engage in collective negotiation that 
would result cause anticompetitive results, such as, as a matter of 
 
253 See id. 
254 See id. 
255 See Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018, S. 140, 115th Cong. § 
701 (2018). 
256 See id. 
257 See id. at § 703. 
258 See id. at §§ 703 and 709. 
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illustration, reduction in capacity.259 Moreover, a common carrier 
is prohibited from participating simultaneously in a rate discussion 
agreement and an agreement to share vessels in the same trade if 
that is likely by a reduction in competition to unreasonably reduce 
transportation service or increase transportation cost.260 Regarding 
enforcement, while the 2018 Coast Guard Act expanded the 
FMC’s enforcement powers, the legislation expressly provides that 
nothing “shall be construed to limit the authority of the Department 
of Justice regarding antitrust matters.”261 
Unfortunately, the 2018 Coast Guard Act’s changes are but “a 
modest course correction, rather than a sea change, in the current 
regulatory regime.”262 The U.S. clearly is a trading and financing 
nation and no longer owns or operates many merchant ships in 
international trade.263 As Mr. Thomas A. Allegretti, President and 
Chief Executive Officer of American Waterways Operators 
testified on May 3, 2017, “[i]t is fundamentally unfair, 
anticompetitive, and detrimental to the U.S. maritime industry to 
skew the playing field in favor of massive international shipping 
conglomerates, which include foreign, State-owned enterprises” at 
the expense of U.S. businesses.264 
 
259 See id. 
260 See id. at § 708. 
261 Id. at § 709(b)(1) (adding 46 U.S.C. § 41105(A) (2012)). See also Donald J. Trump, 
Statement by the President, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/st[;atement-by-the-president-11/ 
[https://perma.cc/482Z-L8YR] (“Finally, the reference in section 709(a)(2) of the Act to 
the ‘antitrust laws’ should not be interpreted to give the Federal Maritime Commission 
(FMC) the authority to construe the antitrust laws in the first instance, which is a 
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Department of Justice. Importantly, section 709(b)(1) provides that nothing in section 
709(a)(2) ‘shall be construed to limit the authority of the Department of Justice regarding 
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to the Department of Justice regarding interpretations of the Federal antitrust laws, 
including when the FMC applies its section 709(a)(2) authority.”). 
262 John Longstreth & Michael F. Scanlon, Recent Amendments to the Shipping Act, 
K&L GATES (Dec. 20, 2018), http://www.klgates.com/recent-amendments-to-the-
shipping-act-a-course-correction-not-a-sea-change-12-20-2018/ [https://perma.cc/2JM6-
CC34]. 
263 See id. 
264 See American Waterways Operations Before the House Committee on 
Transportation & Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard & Maritime 
Transportation, 115th Cong. (2017), (testimony of Thomas A. Allegretti, President and 
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U.S. policy must develop to support efficient and inexpensive 
transportation of commodities and finished goods by sea to and 
from the U.S. including private investments in foreign flag vessels 
by U.S. businesses, such as Amazon and its competitors. This is 
essential to the long-term economic well-being of many aspects of 
the U.S. and global economies.265 To effectively support this 
crucial national objective, it is necessary that the U.S. continue to 
consider its legislative and judicial priorities, and encourage the 
use of U.S. forums to support and enforce fair, efficient, and cost-
effective proceedings that protect the rights and responsibilities of 
all the parties engaged in worldwide trade by sea. 
To function in the contemporary era of international e-
commerce, the U.S. and its major trading partners must revisit the 
laws governing sale of goods, international transportation, 
financing, ocean shipping, loss allocation, marine insurance, and 
liability of the carriers for damage, loss, and delay of goods in 
transit and storage. While the enactment of the Shipowners’ 
Limitation of Liability Act266 may have been appropriate in the 
mid-19th century, as was the enactment of the Harter Act267 four 
decades later and COGSA another four decades later, this 
 
Chief Executive Officer) https://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2017-05-03_-
_thomas_testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/72YX-VGBJ]. 
265 See World Shipping Council Before the H. Comm. on Transportation & 
Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation, 115th Cong. 
(2017), (testimony of John W. Butler, President and Chief Executive Officer) (“The first 
point is that the liner shipping industry is a critical link in our Nation’s international 
trade, and it is a major driver of the economic vitality of this country. Whether our 
members are carrying consumer goods to retailers in the United States, supplying parts to 
automobile manufacturers, or carrying U.S. agricultural goods to foreign markets, liner 
shipping touches almost every part of the U.S. economy.”). 
266 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2012); see also In re Complaint of Dammers & 
Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(“The Act provides that the liability of a shipowner incurred as a result of a maritime 
accident ‘without the privity or knowledge of such owner . . . shall not . . . exceed the 
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then 
pending.’”). 
267 46 U.S.C. § 30702–30707 (2012); see also Martin v. Southwark, 191 U.S. 1, 6 
(1903) (“The Harter Act expressly prohibits the insertion in bills of lading of any 
covenant or agreement lessening, weakening or avoiding the obligation of the owner to 
use due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy and capable of performing her intended 
voyage.”). 
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hodgepodge of governing laws has become unworkable in the 
modern age. The industries and the legislative branch need to 
rebuild a functional system that encourages economic progress and 
recognizes the competing interests of each segment. “All of the 
bargaining and all of the debate has but one goal – to make the law 
better and more responsive to the needs of international 
commerce.”268 
Currently, most claims involving waterborne cargo loss and 
damage are resolved outside of the country even where the cargo is 
bound “to or from” the U.S. This was the direct result of the 
Supreme Court’s Sky Reefer decision two decades ago, which 
allowed foreign arbitration of cargo claims where there was an 
agreement in the bill of lading.269 Now the scope of judicial review 
of arbitration awards is quite limited.270 Prime among the required 
actions to govern and protect the multi-trillion dollar global trade 
by sea are the needs to revitalize the role of the US federal courts 
in admiralty and maritime litigation which was established more 
than 225 years ago in Article III of the US Constitution. Also, the 
United States and other sovereigns and international governmental 
bodies, such as the European Union, should explore a 
comprehensive plan to govern and manage the growingly 
interdependent international trade by sea. 
A quarter of a century ago, Professor Joseph C. Sweeney 
issued a clarion call for comprehensive revision of international 
law governing ocean transportation of goods. He also the 
emphasized the need to revisit the entirety of domestic legislation 
governing ocean shipment and the carriage of goods by sea. These 
should remain the objective for the U.S. as well as and the 
international community.271 The importance of international trade 
 
268 Joseph Sweeney, UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation and 
Problem in Maritime Transport of Goods, 22 J. MAR. L. & COM. 511, 538 (1991). 
269 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 530 (1995). 
270 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 909 (6th ed. 2018) 
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271 Sweeney, supra note 268, at 538. 
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in the fashion sector highlights the greater need for prompt and 
urgent attention to this multitrillion dollar issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In the first four months of 2017, American retailers announced 
they were shuttering 2880 storefronts, more than double the 
amount that closed in 2016.272 Capitalizing on the economic 
realities of failing brick-and-mortar-based business models, 
Amazon’s ascendancy in the fashion sector continues.273 Born out 
of the e-book, Amazon seeks to “do to apparel companies what it 
had already done to booksellers: sap profits and eliminate what 
little pricing power these chains commanded.”274 The numbers are 
staggering. Controlling 46% of all American e-commerce, Amazon 
“is expected to triple its share of the U.S. apparel market over the 
next five years.”275 In 2017, Amazon’s clothing sales were greater 
than the combined online sales of Macy’s, Nordstrom, Kohl’s, 
Gap, and Victoria’s Secret.276 Its market share of the U.S. apparel 
business is expected to increase from $16 billion in 2015 to $52 
billion in 2020.277 
Nevertheless, certain challenging hurdles prevent Amazon 
from dominating the fashion sector because most luxury and many 
contemporary brands still refuse to partner with it. First, Amazon’s 
platform is unpolished. For example, when an online shopper 
clicks on the Amazon page for Stella McCartney’s $908 platform 
Oxford shoes, a similar $32.99 pair is listed as a “Customers who 
viewed this item also bought” recommendation right below the 
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product description.278 Just as luxury lives with luxury at malls, 
higher end fashion brands do not want e-commerce platforms 
conflating their products with lower-priced knockoffs. Second, 
Amazon’s counterfeit culture conflicts with the luxury industry. 
Whereas Net-a-Porter, Moda Operandi, and Farfetch do not sell 
counterfeit goods, Amazon’s third-party market place notoriously 
does at low prices.279 To unsophisticated shoppers, counterfeit 
goods sold by third-party sellers on Amazon appear legitimate 
because of the e-commerce platform’s reputation. Third, luxury 
brands have no incentive to deal with Amazon. As an anonymous 
fashion executive stated, “[w]hy would [a brand] undercut [its] 
own distribution channels by selling to them?”280 
Amazon’s inherently anticompetitive business model attempts 
to force brands that refuse to sell on its e-commerce platform to 
work with the company for transportation and distribution 
purposes. In further developing its ocean freight services, Amazon 
comes closer to complete vertical integration. Amazon’s expansion 
into ocean freight transportation positions the company to control 
“the flow of goods from factories in China and India, all the way to 
customers’ doorsteps in New York, Atlanta and London.”281 
Circumnavigation of middlemen allows Amazon to offer 
extremely low shipping costs for its customers.282 If Amazon 
succeeds as intended, “thousands of retailers and independent 
businesses that must ride Amazon’s rails to reach market are 
increasingly dependent on their biggest competitor.”283 
Amazon’s attempt at shipping dominance presents a predatory 
threat to worldwide commerce. Historically, ocean transportation 
seeks to avoid “choke points” that can damage or destroy 
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movement of goods.284 Whether intentionally or as the result of 
fortuitous incidents, international trade could be curtailed by 
Amazon’s vertical integration. Moreover, if Amazon has 
monopolistic control over transportation decisions, this may have 
unintended consequences on customs, duties, and related tax 
concerns. 
If Amazon or a few other entities dominate the ocean 
transportation of goods, they could control financing essential to 
the entire fashion industry. The ability to issue and deliver bills of 
lading is essential to the commercial transactions of international 
trade. If a single source—Amazon—has absolute control over the 
essential commercial paper that is the key to domestic and 
international commerce, that source would have unprecedented 
monopolistic power to impact the financial wherewithal of the 
worldwide fashion industry. This reason alone compels deep 
analysis of what is necessary to ensure the economic viability and 
survival of independent and competitive entities that are essential 
for a balanced global marketplace. 
Perhaps Amazon’s main competitor, Alibaba, will temper its 
anticompetitive ambitions. The Chinese company also heavily 
invested in transportation. While Alibaba did not create its own 
logistics structure,285 it owns 47% of Cainiao, a Chinese logistics 
network.286 Moreover, like Amazon, Alibaba.com Logistics 
provides freight forwarding services from China.287 In December 
22, 2016, Alibaba introduced One Touch, “an import and export 
service provider and an Alibaba affiliate.”288 Thereafter, in January 
2017, Alibaba partnered with Maersk Line, the world’s largest 
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ocean shipping line, to allow Alibaba’s customers to directly 
reserve space on Maersk vessels with online bookings.289 While 
Maersk representatives stated that the deal “was not about 
bypassing the industry’s traditional middleman freight 
forwarders,”290 the arrangement effectively eliminates third party 
intermediaries. This scheme will most likely allow Alibaba to 
obtain a significant market share. Moreover, such practice is 
permissible pursuant to the current U.S. maritime antitrust 
exemptions. 
A market dominated by two companies still offers little choice 
for fashion brands and retailers. Consumers want to buy what they 
want, how they want, and have it delivered when and where they 
deem most convenient. Thus, it is imperative that brands and 
retailers have delivery options. Moreover, the global economy 
benefits from a logistics business environment where there are 
multiple ocean carriers, freight forwarders, NVOCCs, and the like. 
Competition is good for business and essential for all transactions. 
If, however, Amazon succeeds in complete vertical integration 
through its logistics division, even with Alibaba as a potential 
competitor, fashion brands will be at the mercy of one or two 
companies to move their products around the globe. 
During the 2016 campaign, President Trump stated that 
Amazon “has a huge antitrust problem . . . [Bezos] thinks I would 
go after him for antitrust.”291 Nevertheless, current law and 
lawmakers do not fully contemplate Amazon’s monopolistic goals. 
While Amazon undoubtedly should be evaluated under Section 2 
 
289 See Brenda Goh, Maersk, Alibaba Team up to Offer Online Booking of Ship Places, 
REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-alibaba-maersk-
idUSKBN14O0S7 [https://perma.cc/Q8YJ-5PUB]. 
290 Id. 
291 Callum Borchers, Donald Trump’s Antitrust Attack on Jeff Bezos Doesn’t Make 
Much Sense, WASHINGTON POST (May 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/13/donald-trumps-antitrust-attack-on-jeff-bezos-doesnt-make-
much-sense/?utm_term=.2f6b630c40fb [https://perma.cc/XGW9-REYG] (alluding to the 
suggestion that President Trump’s alleged antitrust concerns about Amazon are 
connected to accusations of Bezos using The Washington Post, which Bezos bought in 
2013, as a tool to prevent Trump’s election). See also Emily Stewart, Does Amazon 
Really have Antitrust Issues, THE SHEET (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13570770/1/trump-accuses-bezos-of-using-washington-
post-to-protect-amazon-from-antitrust-issues.html [https://perma.cc/QS7N-B5TL]. 
2019] CONTROLLING CARGO 533 
 
of the Sherman Act, prosecution is unlikely. Makan Delrahim, 
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, while he was 
President Trump’s nominee to lead DOJ’s review of mergers and 
acquisitions, stated that “antitrust is intended to support free 
markets and that the government should intervene only when 
necessary.”292 Approximately one year later, while acting as 
Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division and in 
response to Ms. Khan’s critique293 of the current U.S. antitrust 
regime, Mr. Delrahim stated that “we should encourage fresh 
thinking on how our legal tools apply to new digital platforms. We 
need more thinking—diverse thinking—about these questions. 
And, we need a civil discourse on this topic.”294 While the 2018 
Coast Guard Act and its amendments to the Shipping Act aim to 
conform the current U.S. maritime antitrust regime to 
contemporary realities, it does not set forth the policy to be 
implemented by either DOJ’s antitrust division or the FMC. In 
other words, the enforcement decisions will be based upon the 
policy established by the Executive Branch alone. 
Technological advances and a globalized economy created a 
new type of monopoly that, as exemplified by Amazon, seeks to 
control a product throughout its lifecycle. Amazon wants to control 
the method of manufacture, sale, transportation, financing, and 
final delivery. This is not an issue limited to the U.S. or any single 
country. It is an international threat to worldwide commerce that 
needs to be addressed comprehensively and on a multilateral basis. 
Much will depend on Amazon’s business decisions. Will it limit its 
transportation businesses solely to serving its own domestic and 
global requirements or will Amazon elect to expand to be a 
common or private carrier? The decisions to investigate and 
prosecute criminal and civil antitrust actions frequently are based 
on changing views of national governments, elected politicians, 
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legislators, regulators, and law enforcement officials and their 
international colleagues. Clearly, myriad antitrust issues in 
numerous fora will need to be considered as the result of the 
widespread and worldwide growth of Amazon as not only the 
ultimate provider of goods but now a player in the international 
transportation markets. 
In the meantime, when evaluating their logistics operations, 
fashion brands must develop and maintain relationships that 
provide them with maximum flexibility in obtaining and delivering 
products. Luxury and contemporary fashion brands need logistics 
operations that are responsive to the unique requirements of 
satisfying the needs of their most demanding clients. While it may 
necessitate some additional costs to avoid a monopoly that would 
ultimately control access to the markets and restrict the brands’ 
abilities to satisfy their customers, fashion brands should consider 
these current expenses as long-term investments in their futures. 
 
